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1 Introduction
Finding a partner is one of the most important decisions for potential startup owners. Success-
ful business owners often argue that finding the right partner is the key for a firm’s success.1 In-
deed, many successful companies started as partnerships. Examples include Hewlett-Packard,
Procter & Gamble, and Ben & Jerry’s. Yet, despite successful examples, only 16% of non-
family-owned businesses began as partnerships.2 Who forms business partnerships, and why?
Answering these questions can be valuable not only for potential startup owners, but also for
policy makers who try to boost entrepreneurship via partnerships.
Theoretical studies have identified gains and losses from business partnerships. Working
with a partner may increase a firm’s productivity by a knowledge transfer between partners.
Financially constrained entrepreneurs can increase financing capacity by finding a wealthy
partner. The gains, however, can be offset by moral hazard, that is, the problem of inducing
optimal effort by partners when the private return to effort is smaller than the marginal product
of effort. The overall impact on entrepreneurs of the option to form a partnership will depend
on the magnitude of productivity gain, financing gain, and moral hazard.
In this paper, I quantify the relative importance of productivity gain, financing gain, and
moral hazard in business-partnership formation by developing and estimating a model of part-
nership formation. The estimated model implies productivity gain between partners is the
major driving force behind a partnership formation. For low-wealth partners, however, fi-
nancing gain accounts for the major gains from partnerships. The moral hazard cost is high
among the observed partnerships. A government-guaranteed loan program that specifically
targets partnership firms is in general ineffective in that it does not increase the number of
partnership firms, and its role in improving match quality among partners is less effective than
a loan program targeting any startup firm.
Using the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), a nationally representative
household-based survey of the US population, I first document the pattern of partnership choice
of startup owners. First, business earnings of partners are significantly greater than those of
measurably similar single owners. Second, the predicted probability of becoming a partner
1See, for example, Cohen and Eisner (2010) and Kawasaki (2004).
2The Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). See section 2 in this paper.
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is higher in the lower and upper percentile of the wealth distribution than in the middle.
Third, despite the high earnings among the observed partners, only 16% of startup owners
form partnerships. The high earnings of a partner may be driven either by productivity gains
or by the increased investment from the other partner. The second observation may support
the view that partnerships are driven by a financial motive, because low-wealth individuals are
more likely to be financially constrained (Evans and Jovanovic (1989)). Moral hazard could
be a reason behind the small proportion of partnerships among startup owners.
To disentangle the effect of financing and productivity motives and to quantify the cost
of moral hazard, I develop a simple model of partnership formation. The model is an exten-
sion of Evans and Jovanovic (1989), an occupational choice model between a worker and an
entrepreneur with collateral constraint. I incorporate into their model an option to form a
partnership. By forming a partnership, financially constrained agents can increase borrowing
capacity. I also allow for the possibility that working with a partner requires an additional
ability, such as collaborative skills. A partnership can be formed if mutual gains in productivity
exist or if one partner gains in productivity and the other partner gains in financing despite
the cost of moral hazard. Who is matched with whom is determined in a stable matching
in which no partner would prefer to be a single owner or a worker, and one cannot find two
partners who would both rather form a partnership with each other than remain with their
current partners. The model is estimated by the method of simulated moments.
The estimated model implies the increase in productivity accounts for the major gains
from partnerships among those who choose to be partners: 85% of the aggregate gains for all
partners are attributed to the productivity gains. The key feature in the data driving this
result is that relatively more partners are observed in the upper percentile than in the lower
percentile of the wealth distribution. Given that most of the financially constrained agents are
estimated to be concentrated below 20th percentile of the wealth distribution, the fact that we
observe more partners in the upper part of the wealth distribution implies many partnerships
are formed by two relatively wealthy agents. Because they are not financially constrained, the
only way we rationalize their behavior in the model is by the mutual gains in productivity.
However, the gains from financing are the major gains for low-wealth partners. For the
partners in the first quintile of the wealth distribution, financing accounts for 85% of the entire
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gain from partnerships. The moral hazard cost is high among the observed partnerships. This
cost corresponds to 39% of the entire gain from partnerships.
The estimated model enables me to quantify the extent to which financial friction generates
“mismatch” among partners. The welfare loss associated with the mismatch is 3.16% of the
aggregate welfare losses due to financial friction. However, a group of people − mostly agents
with enough wealth − exist who gain from the mismatch. The welfare gain for these agents
corresponds to 2.14% of the aggregate welfare losses due to financial friction.
Finally, I compare the effectiveness of two government-sponsored funding programs, one
for any startup firm and the other for only partnership firms. The former is more effective
both in helping financially constrained startup owners to create businesses and in improving
the match quality among partners.
This paper is related to the literature on business partnership. Extensive theoretical studies
have examined a reason behind business partnership formation. In the presence of comple-
mentarity between partners, a partnership arises as the optimal contract if the knowledge or a
tacit human capital between partners is not observable or not contractible (e.g., Teece (1980);
Garicano and Santos (2004); Morrison and Wilhelm (2004); Bar-Isaac (2007)).3 On the other
hand, Legros and Newman (1996) show that agents’ wealth can play an important role in
partnership formation in the presence of financial friction. Regarding the cost of partnerships,
moral hazard between partners has been the primary theoretical concern since Holmstrom
(1982).4 I contribute to this line of literature by quantifying mechanisms discussed in theo-
retical studies using a parsimonious equilibrium model of partnership formation. Gaynor and
Gertler (1995) and Lang and Gordon (1995) also empirically examine business partnership.
They show the extent of moral hazard among partners in the professional industry depends
on the degree to which the partners spread risk. This paper complements their studies by
examining different motives for partnership formation that are particularly relevant to startup
firms in general industries.5
3Related to this line of literature, Jensen and Meckling (1992) and Becker and Murphy (1992) point out
that a firm’s productivity can decrease due to difficulties in coordination and communication between partners.
4The papers that study moral hazard in teams include Radner (1986), Rasmusen (1987), Legros and Mat-
sushima (1991), Legros and Matthews (1991), Miller (1997), Strausz (1999), Battaglini (2006), and Rahman
and Obara (2010).
5Another difference is that I focus on the formation of business partnerships among startup owners, whereas
Gaynor and Gertler (1995) and Lang and Gordon (1995) examine already established partnerships.
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This paper also contributes to the literature on financial friction and new firm formation.
In a seminal paper, Evans and Jovanovic (1989) suggest financial constraint hinders the op-
timal allocation of entrepreneurial talent. The subsequent studies show financial constraint
is an important factor for starting a business (Evans and Leighton (1989); Holtz-Eakin et al.
(1994); Paulson et al. (2006); Cagetti and De Nardi (2006); Adelino et al. (2015); Schmalz
et al. (2016)).6 Related to this paper, Basaluzzo (2006) and Sˇevcˇ´ık (2015) quantify to what
extent the option to find a partner can help financially constrained agents create a business,
and hence increase the aggregate outcome. This paper differs from theirs in two important
ways. First, Basaluzzo (2006) does not allow mutual gains in productivity, and therefore a
partnership is formed only if a complementarity exists between one partner’s gain in produc-
tivity and the other partner’s gain in financing. Similarly, Sˇevcˇ´ık (2015) focuses on the efficient
resource allocation between two separate establishments in the presence of financial friction,
and therefore does not allow a possibility that a partnership is formed due to the increase in
the productivity.7 By allowing gains in mutual productivity as another source of partnership
formation, I show a potential role for financing is relatively small compared to two previous
studies. For example, the number of partners increases only marginally when financial friction
is introduced in the economy. Second, by allowing a match solely driven by gains in mutual
productivity, I can quantify how much financial friction changes the sorting pattern among
startup owners, and how much mismatch due to financial friction drives the welfare loss.8
This paper is also related to the literature on estimating a one-sided matching model (e.g.,
Gordon and Knight (2009); Weese (2015)). In attempting to overcome a challenge − we do
6Hurst and Lusardi (2004) challenge this view by showing a nonlinear relationship between the probability
of becoming a business owner and household wealth.
7Sˇevcˇ´ık (2015) defines the outcome from a partnership between two separate establishments as the sum
of each establishment’s outcome, which has a decreasing returns-to-scale technology with respect to capital.
Because a financially constrained establishment has higher marginal returns to capital, forming a partnership
with an unconstrained establishment can increase efficiency by allocating capital within a partnership. Without
financial friction, however, this incentive disappears and no establishment forms a partnership.
8In a related paper, A˚stebro and Serrano (2015) show independent inventors having a partner can signif-
icantly increase the probability of commercialization success. Different from A˚stebro and Serrano (2015), I
allow heterogeneous productivity gains (or losses) across agents induced by a matching equilibrium, and use
the estimated model to address welfare and policy analyses. Another related paper is Eeckhout and Munshi
(2010), who present a model of competitive matching in which potential borrowers and lenders are sorted into
groups to exploit gains from trade in the presence of financial friction. Like this paper, they also examine how
financial friction and government regulation affect the matching outcome, but the subject of interest is quite
different. They are interested in an informal financial institution in India called Chit funds, whereas I focus
on the business-partnership formation.
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not observe who is matched with whom in the data, especially with respect to net worth − I
exploit the aggregate moments, notably the outcome from the matching. For example, I use
the proportion of partners and the first moment of partners’ earning distribution conditional
on net worth to identify the extent of financial friction.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. A model of partnership
formation is presented in section 3. Section 4 discusses the estimation of the matching model.
The main results are presented in section 5. Section 6 presents a welfare analysis. Policy
experiments are discussed in section 7. Section 8 concludes.
2 Data
The Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) is used for this study. The SIPP is
a nationally representative household-based survey of the United States population designed
to collect information for income and program participation. I chose the SIPP for several
reasons. First, the sample size is large and the survey is nationally representative. The sample
size and the time periods of each panel range from approximately 14,000 to 36,000 households
and from 3 to 4 years, respectively. I use panels including the years 1996, 2001, 2004 and
2008, and hence the time periods spans more than 10 years. Thanks to a large number of
respondents, I can observe a relatively large number of individuals at the time they become
business owners. Second, the SIPP contains information on the respondent’s equity share
of the business. Using this information, I can define partners versus single owners. Finally,
the SIPP provides information on the net worth at the household level, so I can see the
relationship between the probability of becoming a partner and household net worth before
starting a business.9
9Two other sources provide information on ownership choice by startup owners. The Kauffman Firm Sur-
vey (KFS), a panel study of 4,928 businesses founded in 2004, provides detailed information on firm financing,
but does not provide startup owners’ wealth information. Another data source is the Panel Study of En-
trepreneurial Dynamics (PSED). The PSED provides information on two cohorts of startup owners, the one
starting a business in 1998 and the other in 2005. The PSED provides the household net-worth information
by respondents, but it is collected after they start a business. Thus, the net-worth information in the PSED
may reflect activities during the startup process, and the first-year performance of the startup. On the other
hand, the SIPP provides the household net-worth information before a respondent starts a business, which
is more informative in capturing financing capacity when the respondent decides whether to start a business.
Moreover, the SIPP provides the information not only on startup owners but also on workers, so I can observe
the aggregate proportion of startup owners as well as the income distribution conditional on worker and on
startup owners. This information is required to estimate the model developed in this paper. Finally, the
number of observations on startup owners in the SIPP is more than the one in the PSED. For example, the
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Using the SIPP data, I construct a two-year panel. To limit the influence of the labor
market participation, I focus on males ages 18 to 65 who are employed before they start their
businesses. I drop family businesses because forming a partnership among household members
does not increase the total value of household net worth, a mechanism this paper investigates.
In the first year, all agents are workers. In the second year, some of the first-year workers
choose to be business owners. I call the first year the base year and the second year the
subsequent year. I present a detailed sample construction procedure in Appendix A.
2.1 Descriptive Analysis
A business partnership is characterized as a group that divides its profit among its members
(equity holders).10 A partner is defined as a business owner whose share of business equity is
greater than or equal to 25% and less than or equal to 75%. Similarly, a business owner whose
equity share is greater than 75% is defined as a single owner.11
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for characteristics of workers, single owners, and
partners. Excluding family businesses, about 16% of startup owners chose to form partnerships.
The years of education and the years of experience are similar for both types of owners.
Partners are more likely to be white. They are also more likely to be married than single
owners.
Figure 1 depicts the density of equity shares for those who have positive but less than 100%
equity shares. Most of the equity shares are around 50%. This finding may suggest two-owner
partnerships with the same equity share are the most common ownership structure among
startup partnerships.12 Bitler et al. (2005) report the same observation.
Table 2 reports the summary statistics for incomes of workers, single owners, and part-
ners. Figure 2 depicts the density of log incomes for each group. The median income of
total number of startup owners in all cohorts of the PSED is 2,044, whereas the total number of startup owners
in all cohorts of the SIPP is 3,809 as shown in Table 18. For these reasons, I choose the SIPP as the main data
set for this study.
10The literature offers a similar definition (e.g., Holmstrom (1982); Farrell and Scotchmer (1988); Levin and
Tadelis (2005)).
11Given that most business owners have either 50% or 100% equity share, the results in this paper are not
sensitive to this particular definition of partners versus single owners.
12Consistent with Figure 1, in the KFS, 70% of multi-owner firms are two-owner firms, and 84% of two-owner
firms that reported equity share have either 49% to 51% or 50% to 50% equity share.
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startup owners is less than that of workers as is well-documented in the literature (e.g., Hamil-
ton (2000); Pugsley (2013)). Among business owners, median income and mean income of
partners are greater than those of single owners. To determine whether the same pattern is
observed after controlling for other observables, I conduct a regression analysis for log incomes
among startup owners. Table 3 reports the estimates for the regression of log incomes on the
partnership dummy and other covariates. I first start with the typical Mincer regression in
the regression equation (1) and add various controls for other regressions. For all cases, the
partnership dummy is significant and indicates partners earn about 1.5 times more than the
single owners.
Table 4 shows the summary statistics for the net worth of workers, single owners, and
partners. Figure 3 depicts the density of net worth for each group. The wealth distribution of
partners is more dispersed than that of single owners. To further investigate the relationship
between the net worth and the probability of becoming a partner conditional on business
ownerships, I conduct a Probit regression of partnership choice among startup owners on a
fifth-order polynomial in net worth and other covariates. Table 5 reports the estimates from
the Probit analysis. The predicted probability of becoming a partner is higher in the lower
and upper percentile of the wealth distribution than in the middle.
Table 6 reports the number and the proportion of partners for different industries. Partner-
ships are observed in all industries. Based on the National Survey of Small Business Finances
(NSSBF) in 1987, Hurst and Lusardi (2004) categorize construction and services as low-starting
capital industries. They categorize the following as high-starting-capital industries: mining;
manufacturing; transportation and public utilities; wholesale and retail trade; and finance,
insurance and real estate. The partnership proportion for high-starting capital industries is
greater than for low-starting capital industries (p-value 0.10).
Discussion
Two hypothesis could explain the fact that the partners earn 1.5 times more than single owners
even after controlling for other observables. The first hypothesis is that the high earnings stem
from productivity gains through the partnership. The second hypothesis is that the high
earnings stem from the investment by a wealthy partner in a highly productive but financially
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constrained partner.
The fact that the predicted probability of becoming a partner is higher in the lower per-
centile of the wealth distribution than in the middle may support the view that startup owners’
financial motives drive the partnerships. Furthermore, the fact that relatively more partners
are observed in the high-starting capital industries may also support this finance-based hy-
pothesis. One aspect of the partnership is similar to equity financing: financially constrained
potential startup owners may give up some portion of equity in exchange for financing from a
partner. Therefore, partnerships can be particularly attractive for low-wealth individuals who
are more likely to be financially constrained.
Extensive theoretical studies identify moral hazard as a primary concern for working with
a partner. Moral hazard costs may, to some extent, explain the fact that only 16% of startup
owners choose to form partnerships, despite the high earnings among the observed partners.
Among lawyers and physicians, risk sharing is considered the main motive for joining a
partnership (Gaynor and Gertler (1995); Lang and Gordon (1995)). However, certain features
of the data are not consistent with the risk-sharing-hypothesis predictions. First, most part-
nerships are formed by two partners. If the motivation behind finding a partner is to share
risk, the number of partners within a firm would vary depending on the partners’ heterogenous
risk preference. For example, if an agent is highly risk averse, he would find not just one but
many partners who have a similar risk preference. Indeed, Gaynor and Gertler (1995) and
Lang and Gordon (1995) report sufficient variation on the group size for physicians and law
partnerships.13 Second, as Figure 4 shows, the predicted probability of becoming a partner
increases with wealth level after a certain threshold. The opposite relation is predicted if risk
sharing is the main motive for forming partnerships and a decreasing absolute risk-aversion
preference is assumed.14
Although the data pattern is consistent with several hypotheses regarding partnerships,
quantifying each one is difficult without further explanation of the data-generating process.
In the next section, I present a simple model of partnership formation. I use this model as a
13For example, Gaynor and Gertler (1995) report the average and standard deviation for the number of
partners in law partnerships are 21.13 and 8.76, respectively.
14Consider a choice between forming a partnership and being a single owner conditional on deciding to start
a business. Suppose forming a partnership generates a certain payoff, whereas being a single owner generates
a risky payoff. Cressy (2000) shows the probability of becoming a single owner increases as individual wealth
increases, if agents’ preference exhibits a decreasing absolute risk aversion.
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measurement tool to quantify the productivity gain, the financing gain, as well as the cost of
moral hazard. The model is also used for welfare and policy analyses.
3 A Model of Partnership Formation
Agents make decisions in two stages. In the first stage, called the matching stage, agents decide
whether to form a partnership, start a business alone, or become a worker. A partnership is
formed by no more than two agents.15 In the second stage, called the production stage,
agents produce the outcome. I solve the model backwards. In section 3.1, I first introduce the
environment in the production stage. In section 3.2, I present the environment in the matching
stage.
3.1 The Production Stage (The Second Stage)
The environment in the production stage is an extension of Evans and Jovanovic (1989). I
incorporate effort and heterogeneous partnership productivity into their model.
Preference
The utility is linear in consumption. The effort is incorporated to capture moral hazard between
partners. Under the quadratic form, I can derive an analytic value function, which significantly
reduces the computational burden in the estimation. The marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and effort is captured by κ:16
u(c, z) = c− κz
2
2
, c: consumption, z: effort
15This assumption is based on the fact that a majority of business partnership are formed by two owners.
Although allowing a partnership with more than two agents is more realistic, characterizing and simulating
the model would be too costly.
16Based on the empirical evidence discussed in section 2.1, I abstract the risk-sharing motive from the model.
Basaluzzo (2006) finds that the ratio of business wealth to total wealth is on average higher among partners
than single owners from the Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF), and conclude portfolio diversification does not
appear to be the main reason for business-partnership formation. As a theoretical point of view, Newman (2007)
argues risk-based explanations for entrepreneurship are not consistent with the tendency for entrepreneurs to
be richer than workers. Allowing a convex utility can be more general, but the analytic solution for value
functions will not be available, which in turn makes the computation too costly.
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Technology
Income as a worker is determined by worker productivity (θw) and efforts. Income as a single
owner is determined by solo productivity (θs), capital investment (k), and efforts:
w = θwz
1−αw if d = 1 (worker)
y =

{
θsk
αz1−α − rk}s if d = 2 (single owner) α ∈ (0, 1)
{
θpk
α(z + z′)1−α − rk}p if d = 3 (partner)
The partnership output is determined by partnership productivity (θp), the joint capital in-
vestment, and the efforts from both partners. Under this partnership production function, the
efficient outcome from two identical partners is the same as the sum of each partner’s outcome
if the solo and partnership productivity are the same (Corollary 1 in section 3.1.2). Moreover,
the value from single ownership is the same as the value from hiring the potential partner as
an employee if we interpret hiring an agent as a situation in which (1) the productivity does
not change from the solo productivity, (2) the wage contract is set to eliminate moral hazard
of the worker, and (3) the wage is equal to the marginal benefit of hiring the agent. I allow the
earning shocks to workers (w), to single owners (s), and to partners (p) with the assumption
that the expectation of the shocks is equal to 1.17
Financial Market
Without financial friction, agents can borrow any amount of money for the risk-free gross
interest rate r. A financial friction is modelled as a limited commitment between borrowers
and lenders. The fact that lenders cannot force borrowers to repay a loan limits the maximum
amount of borrowing. I assume the maximum borrowing amount depends on the borrowers’
net worth. More specifically, a single owner can borrow up to (λ − 1)A. λ is a constant that
is greater than or equal to 1. Therefore, the maximum amount of investment by the single
owner is (λ− 1)A+A = λA. If he forms a partnership with another agent with net worth A′,
17Business owners in SIPP were asked to report their profits as business earnings. To make the model
consistent with the data, I specified a random shock as a shock to a firm’s profit.
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the partnership can invest up to λ(A+ A′).
3.1.1 Value Functions and Earned Incomes
I first consider the value function and earned incomes for partners. The occupational choice
made in the first stage is assumed to be irreversible, and therefore the outside option for each
partner when the partnership dissolves is zero. The equity share is assumed to be determined
as the symmetric Nash bargaining solution. The solution is equal sharing.18 In the matching
stage, however, agents may use an ex-ante transfer to attract a better partner. I discuss this
issue more in section 3.2.2.
Effort in an entrepreneurial team is spent on activities such as generating an idea, validating
the business idea, and developing a business model. Effort in these types of activities is hard
to observe or monitor. For this reason, I assume effort is not observable.
Suppose agent i and agent j are matched and their partnership productivity is given as
θp. The partners choose {zi, zj, k}, their effort levels and the joint investment. {zi, zj, k} is
determined as the Nash equilibrium of a simultaneous-move game between two partners.
Given {zj, k}, the best-response function for zi solves
max
zi
E
[1
2
{
θpk
α(zi + zj)
1−α − rk}p]− κz2i
2
Likewise, given {zi, k}, the best response of zj solves
max
zj
E
[1
2
{
θpk
α(zi + zj)
1−α − rk}p]− κz2j
2
Finally, given {zi, zj}, k solves
max
k
E
[{
θpk
α(zi + zj)
1−α − rk}p]
18Equal sharing is a defining feature of partnerships. For example, Farrell and Scotchmer (1988) define a
partnership as “a group that divides its output equally among its members.” Indeed, many data sources,
including the sample in this paper, indicate two owners with equal shares are the most common partnership
structure. Many studies investigate theoretical implications of equal sharing in partnerships (e.g., Farrell and
Scotchmer (1988); Sherstyuk (1998); Levin and Tadelis (2005)). Others provide a rationale for equal sharing
among partners (e.g., Bartling and von Siemens (2010); Espino et al. (2015)). Moreover, under the production
technology in section 3.1, the equal sharing is the sharing rule that maximizes the aggregate outcome from a
partnership.
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The earned incomes and value function per partner are given as
pip(θp, Ap) =
1
2
[
θpk
∗α(2z∗)1−α − rk∗
]
p
=

a1θ
2
1−α
p p if λAp ≥ aˆθ
2
1−α
p
{
a8
(
λAp
2
) 2α
1+α
θ
2
1+α
p − rλAp2
}
p if λAp < aˆθ
2
1−α
p
Vp(θp, Ap) = E[pip(θp, Ap)]− κz
∗2
2
=

a3θ
2
1−α
p if λAp ≥ aˆθ
2
1−α
p
a4
(
λAp
2
) 2α
1+α
θ
2
1+α
p − rλAp2 if λAp < aˆθ
2
1−α
p
where
Ap = Ai + Aj, aˆ =
(1− α
κ
)(α
r
) 1+α
1−α
, a3 = aˆr
(1− α
α
)(3
8
)
,
a4 =
(1− α
2κ
) 1−α
1+α
(3 + α
4
)
, a1 = aˆr
(1− α
2α
)
, a8 =
(1− α
2κ
) 1−α
1+α
Given the worker productivity θw, workers choose effort to maximize their utility. The
earned incomes and value function as a worker aregiven as
piw(θw) = a6θ
2
1+α
w w
Vw(θw) = a2θ
2
1+α
w
where
a2 =
(1− α
κ
) 1−α
1+α
(1 + α
2
)
, a6 =
(1− α
κ
) 1−α
1+α
Single owners optimally choose the amount of investment and efforts, and the earned in-
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comes and value function are given as
pis(θs, A) =

2a1θ
2
1−α
s s if λA ≥ aˆθ
2
1−α
s
{
a6(λA)
2α
1+α θ
2
1+α
s − rλA
}
s if λA < aˆθ
2
1−α
s
Vs(θs, A) =

a1θ
2
1−α
s if λA ≥ aˆθ
2
1−α
s
a2(λA)
2α
1+α θ
2
1+α
s − rλA if λA < aˆθ
2
1−α
s
To summarize, the individual choice (d) and the corresponding conditional income (pi) are
d = arg max
{
Vw(θw), Vs(θs, A), Vp(θp, Ap)
}
pi =

piw(θw) if d = 1 (worker)
pis(θs, A) if d = 2 (single owner)
pip(θp, Ap) if d = 3 (partner)
3.1.2 Decomposing Benefits and Costs of Partnerships
Before further discussions, I derive the value for each partner from the first-best allocation. In
doing so, I assume the aggregate production from the efficient allocation is distributed equally
among partners.
Proposition 1. The value function for each partner from the efficient allocation under finan-
cial friction is given as (1)
V Ep (θp, Ap) =

a1θ
2
1−α
p if
λAp
2
≥ aˆθ
2
1−α
p
a2
(
λAp
2
) 2α
1+α
θ
2
1+α
p − rλAp2 if λAp2 < aˆθ
2
1−α
p
(1)
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Proof See Appendix C.1.
With Proposition 1 in hand, it is straightforward to prove the following corollaries:
Corollary 1. V Ep (θs, 2A) = Vs(θs, A)
Suppose two identical agents form a partnership and the solo and partnership productivity
are the same. Corollary 1 says the sum of each partner’s value as a single owner is equal to the
aggregate value of the partnership. Three channels make the value from partnerships different
from the value from single ownership.
Corollary 2. V Ep (θp, 2A) = Vs(θp, A) > Vs(θs, A) if and only if θp > θs
Suppose A = A′. The first-best value from partnerships is greater than the value from single
ownership if and only if the partnership productivity is greater than the solo productivity. The
value difference in Corollary 2 captures the value generated by the partnership productivity.
Corollary 3. V Ep (θs, Ap) > Vs(θs, A) if and only if A
′ > A and λA < aˆθ
2
1−α
s
Although the partnership productivity and the solo productivity are the same, if an agent
is financially constrained as a single owner and his partner’s net worth is greater than his net
worth, the value from the partnership is strictly greater than the value from single ownership
if no moral hazard exists. The value difference in Corollary 3 captures the value generated by
financing. Notice that if no financial friction exists, the value difference induced by financing
would be zero.
Corollary 4. Vp(θs, 2A) < V
E
p (θs, 2A) = Vs(θs, A)
Finally, the moral hazard cost is captured by the value difference in Corollary 4.
To summarize,
Vp(θp, Ap)− Vs(θ, A) = V Ep (θp, 2A)− Vs(θs, A)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ω1
+V Ep (θp, Ap)− Vs(θp, A)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ω2
+ Vp(θp, Ap)− V Ep (θp, Ap)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ω3
(2)
where Ω1 represents gains from productivity, Ω2 represents gains from financing, and Ω3 cap-
tures the moral hazard cost.
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3.2 The Matching stage (The First Stage)
In this section, I describe the environment for the matching stage. Section 3.2.1 describes
how the partnership productivity is determined if two agents are matched, and section 3.2.2
describes the environment for the matching market.
3.2.1 Matching Function and Complementarities
First, I model partnership productivity as a function of the solo productivity of each partner.
More specifically,
θp(i, j) =
√
θ˜iθ˜j where θ˜i = giθsi, θ˜j = gjθsj, gi, gj > 0 (3)
Knowledge transfer has been considered the key mechanism through which teamwork increases
productivity (Lazear (1998); Argote and Ingram (2000)). However, knowledge transfer is hard
and it can be costly due to difficulties in coordination and communication (Arrow (1969); Teece
(1977); Becker and Murphy (1992); Jensen and Meckling (1992); Haas and Hansen (2005);
Jones (2009)). “Collaborative skill” (Hamilton et al., 2003) and “willingness to cooperate”
(Kosfeld and von Siemems, 2011) are necessary to facilitate the knowledge transfer. More
importantly, such characteristics are heterogenous across individuals independent of the quality
of their business idea. g captures this additional element for teamwork. I call this additional
element “collaborative skill.” Depending on individual skills for collaborating, it can enhance
(g > 1) or reduce (g < 1) the solo productivity when partners work together. As a result, the
productivity as a partner (θ˜) can be different from the solo productivity (θs).
To model the partnership productivity in a tractable way, I impose a couple of assumptions
in (3). First, the collaborative skill (g) interacts with the solo productivity (θs). Second, the
contribution to partnership productivity by each partner is the same. Moreover, if two identical
partners are matched, the partnership productivity is the same as their individual productivity
as a partner. In particular, if we shut down the additional productivity channel by making g
equal to 1, the partnership productivity is the same as the solo productivity when two identical
agents are matched.
To explain how a partnership can be formed, I introduce the following two definitions.
16
Definition 1. There exists complementarity between two partners’ solo productivities in a
partnership by Agent i and Agent j if θp(i, j) ≥ max{θsi, θsj}.
Definition 2. There exists complementarity between one partner’s solo productivity and the
other partner’s wealth in a partnership by Agent i and Agent j if (1) one partner, say, Agent
i, is financially constrained as a single owner, and (2) the other partner, Agent j, has more
net worth than the financially constrained partner and θp(i, j) > θsj.
Suppose no borrowing constraint exists. Then V Ep (θp(i, j), Ap) ≥ max{Vs(θsi, Ai), Vs(θsj,
Aj)} if and only if θp(i, j) ≥ max{θsi, θsj} by Corollary 2 in section 3.1.2. Therefore, without
financial friction, a partnership is formed only if there exists complementarity between two
partners’ solo productivities.
If a borrowing constraint exists, a partnership is formed even without the complementarity
between two partners’ solo productivities. The intuition is found in Corollary 3. If a partner
is financially constrained as a single owner, he may be willing to sacrifice his productivity for
financing. Definition 2 captures this situation.
The complementarity between two partners’ solo productivities and the complementarity
between one partner’s solo productivity and the other partner’s wealth are not mutually exclu-
sive. For example, a financially constrained agent may be matched with a more productive and
wealthier agent if his productivity as a partner is high enough. To determine an equilibrium,
who is matched with whom, I impose another structure on the matching market.19
3.2.2 Matching Market
I model the matching market as a frictionless roommate matching problem. Unlike the mar-
riage matching market, I cannot separate market participants into two groups. I consider a
market without search friction as a benchmark environment. As a robustness check, I re-
estimated the model under the assumption that two agents in the population are randomly
matched to each other, and are not allowed to form a partnership with any other agent except
for the randomly matched agent. The result is discussed in Appendix E.
19Under the joint production technology defined in section 3.1, which is multiplicatively separable between
the matching function and the joint effort, a concern about moral hazard does not affect the sorting pattern
(Vereshchagina (2016)). Nevertheless, the moral hazards affect the matching outcome by decreasing the joint
value from any partnership, and hence by decreasing the incentive for individuals to form a partnership.
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Although equal sharing of equity is the most common ownership structure for partnership
firms, some of those partnerships may be involved with ex-ante cash transfers. Before choosing
between a non-transferable and transferable utility setup, I simulate two identical economies
and compare the selection pattern − the number of agents for each occupation − and the
sorting pattern under two different assumptions: one under non-transferable utility and the
other under transferable utility. A detailed explanation for this analysis is found in Appendix
D. Overall, both the selection and the sorting pattern are very similar under two assumptions.
On the other hand, the computational time is much more costly for finding a stable matching
with allowing ex-ante transfers. For these reasons, I choose the non-transferable utility with
the equal sharing as the benchmark for estimation.
N agents exist. Let I denote the set of agents. An agent i ∈ I is characterized by
{gi, θsi, Ai}. I assume θsi is drawn from a continuous distribution, and therefore every agent
has a different value of θs. A matching Γ is a one-to-one mapping from I onto itself such that
for all {i, j} ⊂ I, Γ(i) = j if and only if Γ(j) = i. A matching is stable if (i) no partner would
prefer to be a single owner or worker, and (ii) one cannot find two partners who would both
rather form a partnership with each other than remain with their current partners.
Proposition 2. A unique stable matching exists.
Proof With 50% to 50% equity share, the value per partner from any partnership is
symmetric. Moreover, for any agent i ∈ I, the value from partnership with k ∈ I − including
to remain single − is different for all k because every agent has a different value of θs. In other
words, every agent has a strict preference over I. Under these two conditions, a unique stable
matching exits according to Gordon and Knight (2009). 
Without a borrowing constraint, characterizing a stable matching is straightforward by the
matching function in (3). For expositional purposes, assume g is so large that every agent wants
to form a partnership rather than remain as either a worker or single owner. Sort agents in I
with respect to θ˜ and denote the agent with the highest θ˜ be 1 and so on. With (3), every agent
wants to be matched with Agent 1. Choosing his partner is then Agent 1’s decision. Again,
under (3), Agent 1 wants to form a partnership with Agent 2. By iterating this procedure, we
can find a stable matching. The stable matching exhibits a positive assortative matching with
respect to θ˜.
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With a borrowing constraint, however, the stable matching under no borrowing constraint
can alter because of the financial motive for financially constrained agents. For example,
consider a partnership formed by Agent 1 and Agent 2 in the above example. If financial
friction is introduced, Agent 1 and Agent 2 may not be able to finance the optimal amount of
capital, and the value from their partnership may decrease. Suppose Agent 3 has a marginally
lower productivity but has a much higher net worth than Agent 2. With financial friction,
Agent 1 may prefer to be matched with Agent 3 because he can increase financing capacity
with Agent 3 without sacrificing much productivity.
3.3 Computational Algorithm
Before characterizing the stable matching with and without financial friction, I introduce a
computational algorithm to find the stable matching:
STEP1
- Count the number of agents in the matching market, and call it N.
- Pick any agent in the matching market and call him ‘i1.’
- Find the most preferred agent, including himself, for agent ‘i1.’ Call the
chosen agent ‘i2.’
STEP2
- If ‘i2’ is equal to ‘i1,’ that is, if the agent ‘i1’ prefers to be either a
worker or a single owner to forming a partnership with the best agent in the
market, ‘i1’ goes out of the matching market and become either a worker or
a single owner. Go to STEP1 and pick an remaining agent in the market and
call him ‘i1.’ Replace the number of agents in the matching market with N−
1.
- If ‘i2’ is not equal to ‘i1,’ go to STEP3.
STEP3
- Find the most preferred agent, including himself, for agent ‘i2.’ Call the
chosen agent ‘i3.’
- If ‘i3’ is equal to ‘i2,’ ‘i2’ goes out of the matching market and become either
a worker or a single owner. Go to STEP1 and pick an remaining agent in the
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market and call him ‘i1.’ Replace the number of agents in the matching market
with N − 1.
- If ‘i3’ is equal to ‘i1,’ then ‘i2’ and ‘i1’ form a partnership and go out
of the matching market together. Go to STEP1 and pick a remaining agent in
the market and call him ‘i1.’ Replace the number of agents in the matching
market with N − 2.
- If ‘i3’ is not equal to either ‘i1’ or ‘i2,’ go to STEP1 and call ‘i3’ ‘i1.’
Starting with the entire sample, the computational algorithm terminates when no agent is
left in the matching market. Note this algorithm is not guaranteed to terminate if a stable
matching does not exist. For example, consider a matching market with three agents. Suppose
Agent 1’s best option is to form a partnership with Agent 2, Agent 2’s best option is to form
a partnership with Agent 3, and Agent 3’s best option is to form a partnership with Agent
1. The above algorithm never terminates in this example. Thanks to the uniqueness result
proven in section 3.2.2, however, the algorithm always terminate with the current model, and
the computation time is quite fast even with more than 10,000 observations. Practically, if I
sort the entire sample with respect to their ability as a partner, and start the algorithm with
the agent with the highest ability as a partner, the computation time is the shortest.
3.4 Characterization
A simple example
I first present a simple example that can clearly show how financial friction changes the stable
matching. Suppose four agents are in the market. The outside option value for workers is
assumed to be zero and hence the relevant characteristics for matching is {gi, θsi, Ai}. Assume
gi is 1.2 so that we can focuss on {θsi, Ai}. Assume
{θs1, A1} = {2.1, 0}, {θs2, A2} = {2, 0}, {θs3, A3} = {1.1,∞}, {θs4, A4} = {1,∞}
For convenience, let a1 = 1, α = 0.5.
First, I consider a situation in which no borrowing constraint exists. The outside option
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value as a single owner for each agent is the following:
Vs1 = θ
4
s1 = 19.45, Vs2 = θ
4
s2 = 16, Vs3 = θ
4
s3 = 1.46, Vs4 = θ
4
s4 = 1
It is easy to check that Agent 1 is matched with Agent 2 and Agent 3 is matched with Agent
4 in the stable matching. The value from the matching is
Vp(1, 2) =
3
4
(
θp(1, 2)
4
)
= 27.43, Vp(3, 4) =
3
4
(
θp(3, 4)
4
)
= 1.88
Note θp(1, 2) ≥ max{θs1, θs2} and θp(3, 4) ≥ max{θs3, θs4}, and hence both partnerships are
driven by the complementarity between two partners’ solo productivities.
Suppose now a borrowing constraint exists. The outside option value as a single owner
changes:
Vs1 = 0, Vs2 = 0, Vs3 = θ
4
s3 = 1.46, Vs4 = θ
4
s4 = 1
In this situation, it is easy to check that Agent 1 is matched with Agent 3 and Agent 2 is
matched with Agent 4 in the stable matching. The value from the matching is
Vp(1, 3) =
3
4
(
θp(1, 3)
4
)
= 8.3, Vp(2, 4) =
3
4
(
θp(3, 4)
4
)
= 6.22
Note θp(1, 3) < max{θs1, θs2} and θp(2, 4) < max{θs3, θs4}, and hence both partnerships are
driven by the complementarity between one partner’s solo productivity and the other partner’s
wealth, not by the complementarity between two partners’ solo productivities.
Financial Friction, Number of Partners, and Sorting Pattern
To see how financial friction affects the sorting pattern across individuals, I parameterize an
economy as below, and simulate 10,000 individuals:
{κ, α} = {1, 0.3}, θw = 1, log θs ∼ N(1, 1), log g ∼ N(0, 1), logA ∼ N(0, 10)
Then by using the computational algorithm developed in section 3.3, I find the stable matching.
I first find the stable matching without financial friction. The sorting pattern with respect
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to an individual’s ability as a partner, log(g · θs), is shown at the upper panel in Figure 5.
As illustrated in section 3.2.2, the positive assortative matching is clearly observed, and the
correlation is 1. The sorting pattern with respect to individual log wealth is shown in the
upper panel in Figure 6. If no financial friction exists, wealth does not affect a match between
two partners, and as a result, we observe no relationship between two partners’ wealth levels.
The correlation is zero.
With the same simulated individuals, I next solve the stable matching by assuming λ is
equal to 1. Before discussing the sorting pattern, I first show how the number of workers,
single owners, and especially partners change. As Table 7 shows, the number of partners
increases almost 20% when the financial constraint is imposed. When financial friction is
introduced, additional gains from forming a partnership arise due to complementarity between
one partner’s ability and the other partner’s wealth, as described in Definition 2. As a result,
some agents who could have been single owners choose to form a partnership, and the total
number of partners increases.
This simulation suggests the impact of financial friction on the extensive margin of business
ownership could be overstated if we ignore the option to form a partnership. In the current
simulation, the proportion of business owners decreases less than 2% even with the severe
financial constraint (λ = 1). In section 5.3, I quantify the extent to which the option to form
a partnership alleviates the barrier to becoming a business owner in the presence of financial
friction by using the estimated model.
Financial friction not only changes the number of partners, but also changes the sorting
pattern among partners. The sorting pattern with respect to an individual’s ability as a partner
is shown in the lower panel in Figure 5. Comparing the sorting pattern without financial
friction, the extent of positive assortative matching is reduced. The correlation between two
partners’ ability becomes 0.76 as opposed to 1 in the case without financial friction.
The sorting pattern with respect to wealth is shown in the lower panel in Figure 6. Contrary
to the case without financial friction in which the correlation between two partners’ wealth is
zero, a clear negative assortative matching pattern is observed when the financial constraint
is imposed. The correlation between two partners’ wealth when λ = 1 is -0.67.
In sum, financial friction may increase the number of partners, decrease the extent of
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positive assortative matching with respect to an individual’s ability, and induce a negative
assortative matching with respect to an individual’s wealth. In section 6, I quantify the
welfare implication from these changes in detail.20
4 Estimation
4.1 Specification
Before estimation, I specify wage equation, solo productivity, and the collaborative skill. The
specification is similar to the one in Evans and Jovanovic (1989), Xu (1998), and Paulson et al.
(2006).
Wage Equation
Remember log earnings for workers are characterized by log piw = log a6 +
2
1+α
log θw + log w
where a6 = (
1−α
κ
)
1−α
1+α . I assume log earnings for workers are a function of education (x1) and
experience (x2), by setting log θw = γ1 log x1 + γ2 log x2:
log piw = log a6 + γˆ1 log x1 + γˆ2 log x2 + log w
where γˆ1 =
2γ1
1+α
and γˆ2 =
2γ2
1+α
. The earning shock follows a log normal distribution with the
expected value being equal to 1 (i.e., log w ∼ N(−12σ2w, σ2w)) following Evans and Jovanovic
(1989).
Solo Productivity
The solo productivity is assumed to be a function of education, experience, net worth, and an
unobserved component:
log θs = β0 + β1 logA+ β2 log x1 + β3 log x2 + η, where η ∼ N(0, σ2η)
20In Appendix F, I characterize and discuss two more matching outcomes, one allowing a correlation between
the solo productivity and net wealth, and the other allowing a correlation between the collaborative skill and
the worker ability.
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Similar to Evans and Jovanovic (1989) and Paulson et al. (2006), I allow a possible relationship
between an agent’s net worth and his value as a single owner even without financial friction.
Collaborative Skill
I specify g as a function of an observable and unobservable component:
log g = g0 + g1 log x1 + g2 log x2 + u, u ∼ N(0, σ2u) (4)
As explained in section 3.2.1, g represents an additional ability as a partner, such as collab-
orative skill. Education and work experience are inevitably involved with social interaction,
and therefore may help to develop the collaborative skill.
A critical assumption is that g is not a function of net worth. As explained in section 4.2,
this assumption is required for identification of λ. Note that even if g is not a function of net
worth, the partnership productivity is a function of net worth because it is also affected by
θs, which is a function of net worth. Also note that even if the solo productivity θs and the
collaborative skill g are independent, solo productivity and an individual’s ability as a partner
are not because ability as a partner is specified as θ˜ = g · θs in section 3.2.1.
In reality, those who have high collaborative skill may earn more as a wage worker. With
the current data, however, identifying the correlation between the worker productivity and
the collaborative skill is difficult. As a robustness check, I allow a correlation between an
unobserved heterogeneity in worker productivity and the collaborative skill, and discuss the
implication for my main results in Appendix F.
Earning Shocks for Business Owners
As Figure 2 shows, the distribution of conditional income for business owners looks similar to
a log-normal distribution with a possible realization of a zero or negative income. To capture
this stylized feature of the data, I assume the expected value of an earnings shock for business
24
owners is equal to 1, and allow its realization can be a negative value:
s = ˜s − Ps, log ˜s ∼ N(µs, σ2s), E[s] = 1, Ps is a positive constant.
p = ˜p − Pp, log ˜p ∼ N(µp, σ2p), E[p] = 1, Pp is a positive constant.
4.2 Identification
The unique stable matching generates the proportion of workers, single owners, and partners as
well as the distribution of earnings conditional on each choice as an equilibrium outcome. The
analytic representations of these aggregate outcomes are not feasible, and I provide an informal
argument for how a given set of aggregate moments can identify the model parameters.
Given the assumption of lognormality, the distribution of the solo productivity is charac-
terized by the mean ({β0, β1, β2, β3}) and the standard deviation (ση). Also, the distribution
of the collaborative skill is characterized by the mean ({g0, g1, g2}) and the standard deviation
(σu). I will first explain the moments that can be informative to identify the mean parameters.
Suppose β0 increases. The average quality of a business idea among the entire population will
be higher, and more people will start a business. Therefore, the proportion of startup owners
among the entire population can identify β0. Likewise, the proportion of startup owners among
the entire population conditional on net worth, on education, and on experience can identify
β1, β2, and β3, respectively. We can apply a similar argument to identify {g0, g1, g2}. Suppose
g0 has increased. More people can generate a high value as a partner, and the number of
partners will increase in the stable matching. As a consequence, the proportion of partners
among startup owners will increase. Therefore, the proportion of partners among startup own-
ers can identify g0. Likewise, the proportion of partners among startup owners conditional on
education and on experience identify g1 and g2, respectively.
Note that observed log incomes by single owners reflect a truncated distribution of the
solo productivity. Given the solo productivity, the observed log incomes by partners reflect a
truncated distribution of the collaborative skill. Therefore, ση and σu will change the average
log income for observed single owners and for observed partners, respectively. In particular, as
ση becomes higher, the average log income for single owners conditional on either education or
experience will be higher, and therefore these moments can be used to identify ση. Likewise,
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the average log income for partners conditional on either education or experience can be used
to identify σu.
Given the independence of the worker productivity from the solo productivity and from the
collaborative skill, the average income for workers conditional on education and on experience
can identify γ1 and γ2, respectively. With the conditional mean of log income for workers,
for single owners, and for partners being used to identify other parameters, the unconditional
mean of log income for workers, for single owners, and for partners can be used to identify κ
and α.
A couple of data moments identify λ. First, the proportion of partners among business
owners conditional on net worth is only affected by λ given β1. Consider, for example, business
owners with a small net worth in which the measure of constrained single owners is positive.
As λ becomes smaller, the value of those constrained single owners also decreases. As a result,
those owners whose value as a single owner is marginally higher than their value as a worker
or as a partner will change their choice either to workers or to partners. In either case, the
proportion of partners among business owners conditional on the small net worth will increase.
Second, λ also affects the average income both for single owners and for partners conditional
on net worth, by affecting the income for financially constrained business owners.
Finally, the variance of log incomes for workers identifies σw. The variance of log incomes for
single owners identifies σs given Ps. Given σs, the proportion of zero- or negative-income single
owners identifies Ps. Likewise, the variance of log incomes for partners and the proportion of
zero- or negative-income partners identify σp and Pp.
4.3 Method of Simulated Moments
The model is estimated by the method of simulated moments. To estimate the model, the
unique stable matching is solved for each parameter value and for each simulation using the
computational algorithm developed in section 3.3. To compare the data with the model-
simulated moments, I use the moments calculated from the 2004 SIPP panel, which exhibits
the most observations for both single owners and partners.21
21In other words, I consider the entire United States in a particular year as the relevant matching market
for estimation. The same assumption is used in Choo and Siow (2006) when they estimate a model of the
marriage market. By combining information from all industries, an industry-specific effect is more likely to be
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The criterion function is given in (5):
M(ψ) =
[ n∑
i=1
Zi
(
Ki − K˜i(ψ)
)]′
Σˆ−1
[ n∑
i=1
Zi
(
Ki − K˜i(ψ)
)]
(5)
where K˜i(ψ) =
1
ns
ns∑
s=1
ksi (ψ)
Zi represents a vector of instruments and Ki represents a vector of data moments. K˜i(ψ)
represents a vector of moments simulated by the model given a set of parameters ψ. ns is the
number of simulations.22 ksi (ψ) represents a vector of moments given ψ derived per simulation.
The moments choice is guided by the identification argument in section 4.2. In particular,
I use the proportion of single owners and partners and the first and second moment of the
conditional income. I also include the proportion of zero- or negative-income single owners and
that of zero- or negative-income partners. Net worth, education, and experience are used as
instruments.23 I choose Σˆ to be a diagonal matrix that contains variances of the data moments.
The number of parameters and the number of moments are 19 and 32, respectively.
Log value of net worth is required for estimation, and I replace negative net worth with
$1. Before estimation, I normalize one unit of net worth and income as $10,000 in 2011.24
The gross risk-free interest rate, r, is assumed to be 1.1 following the literature (e.g., Evans
and Jovanovic (1989); Xu (1998); Paulson et al. (2006)). The standard errors are calculated
following Gourieroux and Monfort (1996).
4.4 Model Fit
The full set of simulated and targeted moments are shown in Tables 16 and 17 in the Appendix.
All moments are matched quite well, especially moments related to ownership choice. Some
predicted moments related to single-owner income are a little bit higher than actual moments.
First investigated by Hamilton (2000), low earnings for business owners have been explained by
washed out. The SIPP over-samples low-wealth individuals, but the over-sampled individuals are more likely
to be dropped during the sample-construction process as explained in Appendix B.
22I set ns = 3 for estimation.
23Because net worth is an important state variable in the model, I use an interaction between net worth and
the other covariates as additional instruments.
24Evans and Jovanovic (1989) used $1,000 in 1976 as one unit.
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a non-pecuniary benefit (Hamilton (2000); Pugsley (2013)). Abstracting from such a benefit
makes perfectly matching the earnings differential difficult for the current model, especially
for single owners.
5 Results
5.1 Estimates
Table 8 shows the estimates for log worker productivity (log θw) and log solo productivity
(log θs). It shows a 10% increase in the years of education leads to approximately a 4% increase
in worker productivity and a 3.3% increase in solo productivity. Likewise, a 10% increase in
the years of experience leads to approximately a 1% increase in worker productivity and a 0.4%
increase in solo productivity. The education and experience affect both worker productivity
and solo productivity significantly, but their impacts are greater for worker productivity.
Table 8 also shows the relationship between net worth and solo productivity is estimated
to be insignificant. This result is quite different from Evans and Jovanovic (1989). They find
a significant and negative relationship between net worth and entrepreneurial productivity.
Their model does not take into account the fact that an individual who could start a business
with a partner despite a very low wealth level is more likely to have a very high ability as a
partner. As a result, this additional mechanism may be absorbed as a relationship between
net worth and entrepreneurial productivity.
Table 9 shows the estimates for log value of the collaborative skill. It indicates a 10%
increase in the years of education leads to roughly an additional 2.5% increase in productivity
as a partner. The coefficient for the years of experience is estimated to be insignificant. This
finding implies the individual skill for collaborating with a partner is fostered more in schools
than in workplaces. The constant term is estimated at -1.3726, suggesting a large productivity
loss from working with a partner compared to working alone.
Table 10 reports the estimates for {λ, α, κ} and the outcome shocks. The collateral con-
straint parameter (λ) is estimated at 2.1541, suggesting agents can invest up to about twice
their net worth. α is estimated at 0.1964, implying a 10% increase in investments leads to
approximately a 2% increase in outputs for a given effort level.
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To understand the relationship between the solo and partnership productivity, I project a
simulated log θ on a simulated log θ˜. The regression coefficient for log θ is 1.22 and its p-value
is less than 0.001. This finding suggests agents with better solo productivity tend to have
better productivity as a partner. However, the collaborative skill, g, is estimated to be so
low on average that only a small portion (3.4%) of the agents have greater productivity as a
partner than alone. This finding is shown in Figure 7.
Note that I explicitly control for the cost of moral hazard in business partnerships. The
moral hazard cost is not enough to explain the fact that only about 16% of agents choose
partnerships conditional on business ownership. This finding supports the view that the cost
of knowledge transfer outweighs the benefit for most individuals. The finding also supports
the view that a productivity loss results from “collective decision making,” in addition to the
loss from moral hazard in business partnerships. Hansmann (1996) points out that the owners
in a partnership firm often make important decisions, and this decision process can be costly
due to heterogeneous interests among the owners.25
5.2 Decomposing Aggregate Gains
With the estimates of structural parameters, I use equation (2) to measure the benefits and
the costs of the partnerships. More specifically, I use the following metric:
E(η,u)
[ n∑
i=1
{
Vpi(θpi, Api)− Vsi(θi, Ai)
}
Ii(d = 3)
]
=E(η,u)
[ n∑
i=1
Ω1iIi(d = 3)
]
+ E(η,u)
[ n∑
i=1
Ω2iIi(d = 3)
]
+ E(η,u)
[ n∑
i=1
Ω3iIi(d = 3)
]
(6)
Equation (6) decomposes the benefits and the costs of business partnerships for those who
choose to be partners. For each simulation, I calculate Ω1 (gains from productivity), Ω2 (gains
from financing), and Ω3 (losses from moral hazard) in equation (2) for every partner and then
sum them up. After 1,000 simulations, I average the aggregate value of Ω1, Ω2, and Ω3 for
25Merges between firms are similar to forming business partnerships in that the mergers are often thought
to be driven by the gains in productivity. The low estimated g is also in line with the fact that most mergers
− even conditional on being merged − are not successful and are often being divested. (see, e.g., Banal-Estan˜ol
and Seldeslachts (2011) and references therein.)
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partners.
A graphical representation is shown in Figure 8. Most aggregate gains − before subtracting
the losses from moral hazard − are explained by gains from the partnership productivity: 85%
of the aggregate gains are explained by the partnership productivity; the remaining 15% is
explained by the gains from financing.26
To investigate the variation between gains from two sources across the wealth distribution, I
conduct the same exercise for those whose net wealth is below and above the 20th percentile of
the wealth distribution. Figure 9 presents the results. Most gains from financing are generated
by the low-wealth group and it is the major benefit for them: 85% of the aggregate gains for
the low-wealth group is explained by financing. By contrast, most gains from partnership
productivity are generated by the high-wealth group. For them, almost all of the gains are
generated by the partnership productivity.
Note that a partnership is formed only if complementarity exists between the two partners’
solo productivities or between one partner’s solo productivity and the other partner’s wealth.
Looking at Figure 8, we cannot tell whether the large gains in productivity are driven by a
pure productivity motive between partners or by the case in which wealthy but unproductive
partners are matched with poor but productive partners due to a financial motive.
Figure 10 depicts the decomposition in equation (6) with respect to two complementari-
ties. The gains generated by partnerships solely driven by the complementarity between two
partners’ solo productivities explain 73% of the gains from productivity and 62% of the en-
tire gain from partnerships. This result is primarily because 63% of partnerships are driven
solely by the complementarity between two partners’ solo productivities. The remaining 37%
of partnerships are involved with the complementarity between one partner’s productivity and
the other partner’s wealth. Only a small portion (less than 1%) choose a partnership solely
due to the complementarity between one partner’s solo productivity and the other partner’s
wealth.
26I calculate the gains from financing, conditional on partnership productivity. I could have instead calcu-
lated it conditional on solo productivity. The difference between two decompositions matters in the following
situation. Suppose an agent is not financially constrained as a single owner with his solo productivity, but is
financially constrained as a single owner with the partnership productivity. Moreover, his partner’s net worth is
greater than his. With the current decomposition, the agent’s gains from the partnership are captured both by
the productivity gains and the financing gains. By contrast, all the gains from the partnership are attributed
to the productivity gains with the alternative decomposition. As a result, the gains from financing with the
alternative decomposition are smaller than the gains under the current decomposition.
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The key feature in the data driving this result is the following: relatively more partners are
observed in the upper percentile than in the lower percentile of the wealth distribution. For
example, 64% of partners are located above the median of the wealth distribution and 45%
of partners are located above the 70th percentile of the wealth distribution. The relationship
between solo productivity and wealth is estimated to be insignificant; therefore, most of the
financially constrained agents are concentrated in the lower percentile of the wealth distribu-
tion. The fact that we observe more partners in the upper part of the wealth distribution
implies partnerships must exist that are formed by two relatively wealthy agents. Gains such
partnerships generate explain major aggregate gains from business partnerships.
Finally, the cost of moral hazard among partners is estimated as 39% of the aggregate
gains from partnerships (Figure 8). As Figure 9 shows the moral hazard cost is less for the
low-wealth group (29%) than for the high-wealth group (41%).27
5.3 Financial Friction vs. Partnership Friction
Evans and Jovanovic (1989) do not allow an option to form business partnerships. As shown in
section 3.4, however, most financially constrained single owners could find a business partner to
overcome financial constraints, and the number of business owners does not change much even
after a severe financial friction is imposed. Therefore, Evans and Jovanovic (1989) may over-
emphasize the negative impact of financial friction on the transition into business ownership.
To examine this issue, I simulate an economy without financial friction and compare the
number of business owners to the estimated economy.
Table 11 shows the result. The total number of business owners without financial friction
is normalized as 100. After the estimated financial constraint is imposed, the number of single
owners decreases substantially from 84.17 to 73.69, but the number of partners increases only
marginally from 15.83 to 15.88. The financially constrained single owners choose not to find
a partner and instead to become a worker. As a result, the total number of business owners
decreases more than 10% even if the option to form a partnership is allowed. This is because
only a small portion of the agents is assigned the productivity as a partner greater than their
27The moral hazard cost increases as the partnership productivity increases. Some of the low-wealth partners
sacrifice the gains from productivity for the gains from financing. As a result, the moral hazard cost is less for
the low-wealth group than for the high-wealth group.
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solo productivity as shown in Figure 7. The moral hazard cost is also high as shown in section
5.2. Overall, despite the potential gains from financing, the constrained agents do not choose to
form partnerships due to the moral hazard cost and the potential productivity loss associated
with working with a partner.
6 Welfare Analysis
This section analyzes the welfare implication of financial friction. Unlike most of the previous
models with financial friction, the current model features an additional distortion due to finan-
cial friction: the efficiency loss from mismatch. I address an intuition using a simple example
in section 3.4. Because of financial friction, a productive agent with low wealth can be matched
with a less productive agent than the partner with whom he would have been matched if no
financial friction were present.
Table 12A decomposes the welfare losses for each transition group.28 I first normalize the
aggregate welfare losses due to financial friction as 100:
∑N
i=1(Vi − V fi )ILoss = 100. V fi and Vi
represent the value of agent i with and without financial friction, respectively. ILoss represents
the indicator function for Vi − V fi being positive. Most of the welfare losses come from the
single owners who are constrained to become business owners. The welfare loss from this
group accounts for 85.40% of the aggregate welfare losses due to financial friction. The second
biggest source of welfare losses is single owners who remain single owners but with constrained
borrowing. The welfare loss from this group accounts for 11.44% of the aggregate welfare losses
due to financial friction.
Before further discussion, note that in my model, I define the following three situations
as mismatches driven by financial friction: a partner changes his ownership either to being a
worker or a single owner, a worker or a single owner become a partner, and a partner changes
his partner.
Table 12A shows the welfare losses from mismatch account for 3.16% of the aggregate
welfare losses due to financial friction. Of 3.16%, single owners who become partners due
to a financial motive explain 0.49%. Partners who become workers or single owners explain
28I simulated the economy 1,000 times and averaged the results from all simulations.
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0.32%. The remaining 2.35% is due to partners who remain partners, but are matched with less
productive agents than the partners with whom they would have been matched if no financial
friction were present.
The financial friction generates welfare gains for a certain group of people. Table 12B
decomposes the welfare gains for each transition group. Workers who become partners benefit
from financial friction. Their gains correspond to 0.23% of the aggregate welfare losses due to
financial friction. Partners and a small proportion of single owners also benefit from financial
friction. The welfare gains for these business owners correspond to 1.91% of the aggregate
welfare losses due to financial friction. Again, an intuition is shown in section 3.4. Some
partners, workers, and single owners with high wealth can have an opportunity to meet with
more productive agents than the partners with whom they would have been matched if no
financial friction were present.
In Table 13, I further investigate welfare losses and gains due to mismatch with respect
to wealth level. Most welfare losses due to mismatch are generated by individuals whose net
worth is less than the 20th percentile of the wealth distribution. These welfare losses account
for 74.61% of the entire welfare loss from mismatch. This finding is a sharp contrast to the
fact that only 2.55% of the gains from mismatch are generated by low-wealth individuals.
7 Policy Experiments
Financial friction is often a concern for policy makers who try to strengthen entrepreneurship.
The model developed here can be used to evaluate the impact of loan programs not only on
startup owners in general, but also on the formation of business partnerships.29
7.1 Policy 1: Loans for All Startup Firms
To reduce inefficiency from financial friction, I experiment with a policy in which a government
lends startup businesses up to $25,000 at the market interest rate r. I assign $25,000 per
business regardless of the number of owners.
29I simulated the economy with each policy 1,000 times and averaged the results from all simulations.
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Given that the interest rate is the same as the market interest rate, only financially con-
strained startup owners will apply to the loan program as long as a small amount of costs
associated with the application exist. The marginal benefit of additional investment is strictly
greater than the market interest rate for financially constrained agents, and only those agents
apply to the loan program.
The left column of Table 14 shows the welfare gain by Policy 1 for each transition group.
About 97.7% of the aggregate welfare losses from financial friction disappear. Workers who
could have become single owners without financial friction enter business ownership as single
owners thanks to the government loans. The number of single owners increases more than 10%
after the loan program is applied (Table 15). Most financially constrained single owners also
benefit from the loan program and increase investments.
Policy 1 also alleviates mismatch by partners. In doing so, some partners − who can
be matched with more productive partners due to financial friction − are worse off by the
loan policy. The value of their wealth in the presence of financial friction reduces once other
partners can access the loans provided by the government. Despite the gains from alleviating
mismatch, the aggregate number of partners is almost identical before and after the loan
program is applied (Table 15).
7.2 Policy 2: Loans Targeted for Business Partnerships
I experiment with a loan policy in which a government lends only business partnerships up to
$25,000 at the market interest rate r. As in Policy 1, only financially constrained partnership
firms apply to the program.
The Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) program sponsored by the US govern-
ment provides funds only for partnerships between small businesses and nonprofit research
institutions. The goal is to promote commercialization of innovations in science by encour-
aging partnership between the public and private sector. Although the firms targeted by the
STTR program may be quite different from the firms in the sample for this paper, Policy 2
can be helpful to understand an equilibrium impact of the STTR program.
The number of partners remains almost identical before and after the implementation of the
policy (Table 15). Moreover, although the program specifically targets business partnerships,
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the welfare gains generated by improving match quality is smaller than Policy 1: the gains
from alleviating mismatch by Policy 2 are about 43% of the gains from alleviating mismatch
by Policy 1. The key difference is that under Policy 2, partners who would have become single
owners without financial friction still remain as partners. By contrast, under Policy 1, these
partners switch their ownership choice to single ownership and generate welfare gains.
7.3 Discussion
The loan program targeted for general businesses is more effective than the loan program
targeted only for business partnerships. The loan program for general businesses increases
welfare for workers who would have been single owners without financial friction and for single
owners who face borrowing constraints. Moreover, it improves the match quality more than
the loan program specifically targeted for business partnerships.
One caveat of the policy analyses in this section is that I did not take into account appli-
cants’ default decisions. Endogenizing agents’ default decisions can be valuable for analyzing
small business loan programs, but is outside the scope of this paper.
8 Conclusion
I empirically investigate the formation of partnerships among startup owners. I first document
that partners earn significantly more than single owners. In addition, relatively more partners
are observed in the lower and upper percentile of the wealth distribution than in the middle.
Despite the high earnings among observed partners, the proportion of partners is much smaller
than single owners. To further investigate the decision to form a partnership, I develop and
estimate a matching model based on Evans and Jovanovic (1989).
Using the estimated model, I first show the gains from the increase in productivity explain
most gains from the observed partnerships. The gains from financing are the major benefit
to individuals with low net worth. Financial friction generates inefficiency due to mismatch
among partners. A government-sponsored funding program for all startup firms is effective
both in helping financially constrained startup owners create businesses and in improving the
match quality among partners.
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This study focuses on the role of partnerships on the business formations. A limitation is
that I only use the first-year business earnings as a measure of the business’s outcomes. Al-
though the first year’s earnings are highly predictive of future earnings (e.g., Hamilton (2000)),
they cannot fully capture the dynamics of businesses, especially their failure rate. Many new
businesses fail within a few years. A further investigation into whether and how partnerships
are related to business dissolution would shed light not only on business partnerships, but also
on business failures.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Workers Single Owners Partners
Obs. 48,869 946 181
Experience (Year) 19.91 20.50 19.76
Education (Year) 13.76 14.05 14.16
Race (White)(%) 85.36 85.16 92.00
Married ( %) 62.93 61.60 72.78
NOTE: This table reports the summary statistics for characteristics of workers, single owners, and partners.
Mean is reported unless otherwise indicated. The survey weight is applied.
Table 2: Income
Workers Single Owners Partners
Obs. 48,869 833 165
Mean 52,053 43,101 61,948
10% 15,095 3,362 7,503
50% 41,053 23,038 37,515
90% 95,990 100,108 136,107
NOTE: Dollar in 2011. This table shows the summary statistics for incomes of workers, single owners, and
partners given that they reported a positive income.
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Table 3: Income Regression for Business Owners
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(Income) ln(Income) ln(Income) ln(Income)
Partnership 0.586 0.529 0.527 0.461
(0.118) (0.115) (0.114) (0.114)
Education 0.0855 0.0383 0.0351 0.0342
(0.0161) (0.0170) (0.0182) (0.0180)
Experience 0.0277 0.0132 0.0137 0.00568
(0.0145) (0.0143) (0.0142) (0.0145)
Experience2 -0.000618 -0.000378 -0.000397 -0.000228
(0.000319) (0.000313) (0.000312) (0.000315)
Previous income 0.00574 0.00539 0.00489
(0.000821) (0.000818) (0.000811)
Net worth 0.000212 0.000186 0.000229
(0.000103) (0.000103) (0.000102)
Industry dummy No No Yes Yes
Other dummies No No No Yes
Observations 998 998 998 998
R-squared 0.055 0.108 0.136 0.169
NOTE: This table shows the estimates for regression of log incomes on partnership dummy, years of education,
years of experience and its square, previous income, net worth, and industry and other dummies. Partnership
means the partnership dummy. Previous income indicates the wage income in the base year. One unit is
10,000 USD in 2011. Other dummies include race, marital status, and year dummies. Standard errors are in
parentheses.
Table 4: Net Worth
Workers Single Owners Partners
Obs. 48,869 946 181
Mean 182,789 243,826 329,822
10% -5,509 -7,263 -4,138
50% 76,039 90,849 139,875
90% 499,301 698,750 830,313
NOTE: Dollar in 2011. This table shows the summary statistics for net worth of workers, single owners, and
partners.
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Table 5: Net Worth and Partnership Choice
VARIABLES Partnerships
Net worth/100,000 -0.0324
(0.0619)
(Net worth/100,000)2 0.0392
(0.0200)
(Net worth/100,000)3 -0.00530
(0.00240)
(Net worth/100,000)4 0.000236
(0.000113)
(Net worth/100,000)5 -3.26e-06
(1.79e-06)
Education -0.0221
(0.0186)
Experience -0.0107
(0.00450)
Previous income 0.000352
(0.000870)
Race 0.358
(0.160)
Married 0.386
(0.108)
Constant -1.166
(0.310)
Observations 1,127
Pseudo R-squared 0.0423
NOTE: This tables reports the estimates for a Probit regression of becoming a partner on wealth variables
among business owners. Previous income is normalized by 10,000 USD in 2011. Race is the dummy variable for
white. Standard errors are in parentheses. The coefficients for wealth variables are jointly significant (p-value
0.0115).
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Table 6: Industry Decomposition
Industry Single owners Partners Partners (%)
Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting 56 18 24
Construction 263 46 15
Manufacturing 30 8 21
Wholesale trade 31 4 11
Retail trade 65 19 23
Transportation, warehousing, and utilities 48 4 8
Information 16 1 6
Finance, insurance, real estate,
and rental and leasing 50 16 24
Professional, scientific, management,
administrative, and waste management 204 32 14
Services 183 33 15
High−starting capital industry 224 51 19
Low−starting capital industry 446 79 15
NOTE: This table reports the number and the proportion of partners for different industries. Services include
Business and repair services; Personal services; Educational, health and social service; Arts, entertainment,
recreation, accommodations, and food service; Public administration; and other services. High-starting capital
industry includes Manufacturing; Wholesale and Retail trade; Transportation, warehousing, and utilities; and
Finance, insurance, real estate, and rental and leasing. Low-starting capital industry includes Construction
and Services.
Table 7: Financial Friction and Sorting Pattern
Economy w.o Financial Friction Economy with λ = 1
# of workers 2,870 3,057
# of single owners 3,364 2,465
# of partners 3,766 4,478
Corr(P1.ability, P1.ability) 1 0.76
Corr(logA1, logA2) 0 -0.67
NOTE: This table reports the selection and the sorting pattern from two simulated economies. I simulate
10,000 individuals from the economy characterized as follows: {κ, α} = {1, 0.3}, θw = 1, log θs ∼ N(1, 1),
log g ∼ N(0, 1), logA ∼ N(0, 10). The first column of the table reports the results without financial friction,
and the second column of the table reports the results with λ = 1.
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Table 8: Estimates for log Worker Productivity and log Solo Productivity
Parameters Variables Estimates Standard Errors
γ1 log(Education) 0.3986 (0.0078)
γ2 log(Experience) 0.0965 (0.0045)
β0 Constant 0.3054 (0.0236)
β1 log(Net worth) 0.0025 (0.0002)
β2 log(Education) 0.3247 (0.0042)
β3 log(Experience) 0.0370 (0.0035)
ση Std. of η 0.1096 (0.0015)
NOTE: This table presents the estimates for the equation: log θw = γ1 log x1 + γ2 log x2 and log θ = β0 +
β1 logA + β2 log x1 + β3 log x2 + η, where η ∼ N(0, σ2η). A is net worth (10,000 USD in 2011). x1 is the
years of education. x2 is the years of experience. Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 9: Estimates for log Collaborative Skill
Parameters Variables Estimates Standard Errors
g0 Constant -1.3726 (0.0354)
g1 log(Education) 0.2446 (0.0154)
g2 log(Experience) 0.0192 (0.0029)
σu Std. of u 0.3715 (0.0051)
NOTE: This table presents the estimates for the equation: log g = g0+g1 log x1+g2 log x2+u, u ∼ N(0, σ2u).
x1 is the years of education. x2 is the years of experience. Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 10: Estimates for Other Parameters
Parameters Variables Estimates Standard Errors
λ Collateral constraint 2.1541 (1.0669)
α Technology 0.1964 (0.0112)
κ Preference 1.7195 (0.0213)
σw Std. of log w 0.7678 (0.0065)
σs Std. of log ˜s 1.6887 (0.0794)
Ps − 0.0374 (0.0020)
σp Std. of log ˜p 1.0268 (0.0261)
Pp − 0.1451 (0.0016)
NOTE: This table presents the estimates for {λ, α, κ} and the outcome shocks. λ captures the extent of collat-
eral constraint. α governs the marginal productivity of capital. κ captures the marginal rate of substitution be-
tween consumption and effort. The outcome shock to workers (w) is modelled as log w ∼ N(µw, σ2w), E[w] =
1. The outcome shock to single owners (s) is modelled as s = ˜s − Ps, log ˜s ∼ N(µs, σ2s), E[s] = 1. The
outcome shock to partners (p) is modelled as p = ˜p − Pp, log ˜p ∼ N(µp, σ2p), E[p] = 1. Ps and Pp are
some positive constants. Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 11: Financial Friction and Number of Business Owners
Economy w.o Financial Friction Benchmark
Single owners 84.17 73.69
Partners 15.83 15.88
# of business owners 100 89.57
NOTE: This table compares the number of single owners and partners from the estimated (benchmark) economy
with those from the estimated economy but removing financial friction. The number of business owners from
the economy without financial friction is normalized as 100.
Table 12: Decomposing Welfare Losses and Gains Due to Financial Friction by Each Transition
Group (the numbers are normalized by the aggregate welfare losses due to financial friction)
After Financial Friction
(A) (B)
Welfare Loss Welfare Gain
Workers Single Owners Partners Workers Single Owners Partners
Workers 0 0 0 0 0 0.23
Single owners 85.40 11.44 0.49 0 0 0.02
Partners 0.31 0.01 2.35 0 0 1.89
NOTE: Column A of this table presents welfare losses with respect to each transition group after financial
friction is introduced. Column B of this table presents welfare gains for each transition group due to financial
friction. The aggregate welfare losses from financial friction are normalized as 100:
∑N
i=1(Vi−V fi )ILoss = 100.
V fi and Vi represent the value of agent i with and without financial friction, respectively. ILoss represents the
indicator function for Vi − V fi being positive.
Table 13: Welfare Losses and Gains Due to Mismatch by Low-Wealth Individuals (the numbers
are normalized by the aggregate welfare losses due to financial friction)
Welfare Loss Welfare Gain
All agents (a) 3.16 2.14
Agents < 20th (b) 2.36 0.05
(b/a)×100 (74.61%) (2.55%)
NOTE: This table presents losses and gains due to mismatch by low-wealth individuals. Agents < 20th indicate
individuals whose net worth is less than the 20th percentile of the wealth distribution. The aggregate welfare
losses due to financial friction are normalized as 100:
∑N
i=1(Vi−V fi )ILoss = 100. V fi and Vi represent the value
of agent i with and without financial friction, respectively. ILoss represents the indicator function for Vi − V fi
being positive.
46
Table 14: Decomposing Welfare Gains for Policy 1 & Policy 2 by Each Transition Group (the
numbers are normalized by the aggregate welfare losses due to financial friction)
After Policy 1 After Policy 2
Workers Single Owners Partners Workers Single Owners Partners
Workers 0 85.40 0.31 0 0 0.28
Single owners 0 11.44 0.01 0 0 0.01
Partners (G+L) -0.23 0.47 0.26 -0.18 -0.02 0.27
Group (L) -0.23 -0.02 -1.45 -0.18 -0.02 -1.33
Group (G) 0 0.49 1.71 0 0 1.61
NOTE: The table presents welfare gains generated by Policy 1 and Policy 2, respectively. Policy 1 is a loan
program for all businesses with the market interest rate and the maximum lending amount of $25,000. Policy
2 is a loan program for partnership firms with the market interest rate and the maximum lending amount of
$25,000. Group (L) indicates ex-partners who incur a loss due to each policy. Group (G) indicates ex-partners
who benefit from each policy. A minus figure indicates the welfare losses from each policy. To highlight the
extent of welfare improvement by policies, I normalize the gains in both policies with respect to the aggregate
welfare losses due to financial friction, which is normalized as 100:
∑N
i=1(Vi − V fi )ILoss = 100. V fi and Vi
represent the value of agent i with and without financial friction, respectively. ILoss represents the indicator
function for Vi − V fi being positive.
Table 15: Number of Business Owners after Policy 1 & Policy 2
Single Owners (a) Partners (b) Business Owners (a+b)
Benchmark 82.27 17.73 100
Policy 1 93.93 17.68 111.64
Policy 2 82.28 17.74 100.02
NOTE: This table compares the number of business owners after Policy 1 and Policy 2. Policy 1 is a loan
program for all businesses with the market interest rate and the maximum lending amount of $25,000. Policy
2 is a loan program for partnership firms with the market interest rate and the maximum lending amount of
$25,000. The benchmark economy is the estimated economy. The number of business owners in the benchmark
economy is normalized as 100.
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Figure 1: Equity Share for Startup Owners
NOTE: This figure shows the histogram of equity shares for those whose equity share is greater than 1% and
less than 100%.
Figure 2: Kernel Density of Log Income
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Figure 3: Kernel Density of Net Worth
Figure 4: Net Worth and the Predicted Prob. of Becoming a Partner
NOTE: This figure depicts the predicted probability of becoming a partner with respect to net worth based on
the estimates from the regression in Table 5. The median net worth is 76,480 USD.
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Figure 5: Financial Friction and Sorting: Ability
NOTE: The above two figures show the sorting patterns with respect to ability as a partner (log(g · θs)). The
upper figure shows the sorting pattern without financial friction. The lower figure shows the sorting pattern
when λ = 1. The correlation in the upper figure is 1 and the correlation in the lower figure is 0.76.
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Figure 6: Financial Friction and Sorting: Wealth
NOTE: The above two figures show the sorting patterns with respect to the level of wealth (log(A)). The
upper figure shows the sorting pattern without financial friction. The lower figure shows the sorting pattern
when λ = 1. The correlation in the upper figure is 0 and the correlation in the lower figure is −0.67.
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Figure 7: Kernel Density of Collaborative Skill
NOTE: This figure shows Kernel density of a simulated value for g given covariates and estimates. g greater
than 1 means the productivity as a partner is greater than the solo productivity, and g less than one means
the productivity as a partner is less than the solo productivity.
Figure 8: Decomposing Benefits and Costs of Partnerships 1
NOTE: This figure depicts the decomposition of benefits and costs from partnerships for all partners. The
aggregate gains for all partners are normalized as 1.
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Figure 9: Decomposing Benefits and Costs of Partnerships 2
NOTE: This figure depicts the decomposition of benefits and costs from partnerships below and above the
20th percentile of the wealth distribution (blue: partners below the 20th percentile of the wealth distribution;
sky-blue: partners above the 20th percentile of the wealth distribution). The aggregate gains for each group
are normalized as 1.
Figure 10: Decomposing Benefits and Costs of Partnerships 3
NOTE: This figure depicts the decomposition of benefits and costs from partnerships with respect to comple-
mentarities (blue: all partners; sky-blue: partnerships solely driven by complementarity between two partners’
solo productivities; green: partnerships driven by complementarity between one partner’s solo productivities
and the other partner’s wealth). The aggregate gains for all partners are normalized as 1.
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Appendix
A Sample Construction
In this section, I describe the sample construction in more detail. The SIPP was redesigned in
1996. As a result, the variable names, as well as the data-editing and -imputing procedures,
are not consistent between panels before and after 1996. For this reason, I use panels after
1996 including 1996, 2001, 2004, and 2008. The samples between panels are not overlapping.
In SIPP, the respondents were interviewed every four months with questions about, for
example, income level and working hours for each month (these questions are labeled as “core
modules”). In addition, broader questions ranging from household net worth to child support
were asked annually (these questions are labeled as “topical modules”). In particular, for
every third wave of interviewing, SIPP provides the household-level net worth and the share
of business equity for business owners. Because the household net worth is one of the most
important variables for this study and is recorded annually, I construct a panel in which the
time unit is a year.
Type of Business Owners A respondent is defined as a business owner if he answered
yes to the question “Did you own a business?” and his working hours for the business are
greater than his wage working hours30 during at least one of three previous waves (representing
one year) when the household net worth is recorded.31 I define a partner as a business owner
whose share of business equity is greater than or equal to 25% and less than or equal to 75%.32
Business owners whose equity share is greater than 75% are called single owners.
Income SIPP explicitly asks how much each respondent earned for each month in every
wave. In principle, one wave covers four months. I use the monthly income only for the survey
month because little variation exists in monthly incomes within the same wave. Thus, I use
the term “wave” and “month” interchangeably. For example, suppose a respondent reported
earned income for only two months and the total amount of earned income for the two months
30This definition is to differentiate an active business owner from a casual business owner.
31Some respondents in the third wave of 2004 panel were wrongly recorded as business owners
(APDJBTHN=5). I drop these respondents. For more information, see SIPP user note for Business Feed-
Back Problem.
32According to this definition, an incorporated firm with multiple owners is considered a business partnership.
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was $5,000. Then his annual earned income is calculated as $5, 000× 12
2
.
One issue regarding business income is that negative income is reported only for the panel
after 2004 and not for the panel before 2004. This difference is due to a change in interview
questions for business earnings starting in 2004. For example, some portion of earned income
from a business is recorded in TPRFTB after 2004 but not before 2004.33 To make variables
consistent across survey years, I first replace negative income with zero. Then, for startup
owners with zero income, I impute business incomes to the one reported one year after the
subsequent year if it is available.
Other Characteristics Other questions regarding characteristics such as age, sex,
race, marital status, and education were asked in the wave after the household net worth is
recorded. I use this information as the annual characteristics of each respondent.34 The core
modules present industry information both for workers and for business owners. The core
modules also report typical hours worked per week. The potential experience is calculated as
max{age - years of education - 6, 1}.
The Final Sample The final sample is constructed in a similar way to the literature
(e.g, Evans and Jovanovic (1989); Hamilton (2000); Hurst and Lusardi (2004)). It is a two-year
panel for males ages 18 to 65. This sample is chosen to limit the influence of labor market
participation. I call the first year the base year and the second year the subsequent year. I
first drop business owners in the base year. Some respondents started their business from the
last wave in the base year, and I re-categorized these respondents as new business owners in
the subsequent year.35 I also drop unemployed respondents in the base and the subsequent
year.36 I also dropped those owners who did not report household wealth. In addition, I
dropped 15 outliers whose net worth is greater than $10 billion. Among startup owners in
the subsequent year, I drop respondents who answered yes to the question “Was this business
owned entirely by members of this household?” I dropped these individuals for two reasons.
33For more detailed information, see SIPP user note for Business Income and Profit/Loss.
34I impute the years of education for those who did not respond with 13, the average years of education for
the whole population conditional on reporting.
35A handful of respondents reported business owners only in the last wave in the base year and not in the
subsequent year. I dropped these respondents.
36The unemployed are defined as non-business owners who reported “no job” (RMESR ∈ {6, 7, 8}) at least
in two waves during a given year. To limit measurement error, I also drop respondents who were employed but
did not report wage earnings in the subsequent year.
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First, the motivation to form a family business may be different from the motivation to start
a business with non-household members. Second, forming a partnership among household
members does not increase the total value of household net worth, an important mechanism
this paper investigates. I also dropped business owners who reported equity share less than
25%. The sample consists of 49,996 individuals. Of that number, 1,127 became business
owners in the subsequent year, among which 181 are categorized as partners. The number of
observations at each stage of sample construction is summarized in Table 18.
B SIPP Oversampling
For SIPP sample design, the Census Bureau assigned the universe of addresses into two strata,
one with a higher proportion of poverty than the other. The Census Bureau selects more
samples in the high-poverty stratum. Most of the high-poverty regions coincide with areas
populated by more African-American, Hispanic, and female-headed family. As a result, most
over-sampled low-income individuals or families are African-American, Hispanic, or female-
headed families (Huggins and King, 1997). To assess whether the final sample contains rel-
atively more of these low-income individuals, I compare the racial composition of the final
sample with that of the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) in 2011.
Table 19 compares the proportion of African-Americans with respect to income both for the
final sample and for CEX. The proportion of low-income African-Americans in the final sample
is smaller than that of CEX. This observation suggests most of the over-sampled low-income
individuals are more likely to be dropped in the process of sample construction.
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C Proofs
C.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The planner solves the following problem:
max
{zi,zj ,k}
F (zi, zj, k) = E
[
θpk
α(zi + zj)
1−α − rk
]
p − κ
2
(
z2i + z
2
j
)
= θpk
α(zi + zj)
1−α︸ ︷︷ ︸
Aggregate production
−
(
rk +
κ
2
(
z2i + z
2
j
))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Aggregate cost
subject to (zi, zj, k) > 0, α ∈ (0, 1), κ > 0, Ap ≥ 0, k ≤ λAp
(Case 1) λAp ≥ 2aˆθ
2
1−α
p
I first consider the case in which k ≤ λAp is not binding. I show F (zi, zj, k) is a concave
function on U = {x ∈ R3|(zi, zj, k) > 0}. Because F : U → R1 is a C2 function and U is
a convex open subset of R3, F is a concave function on U if and only if D2F (x) is negative
semidefinite for all x ∈ U . By deriving leading principal minors, one can easily show D2F (x)
is negative definite for all x ∈ U and hence negative semidefinite for all x ∈ U . Given that
F (zi, zj, k) is a concave function on U , it is sufficient to show the unique x
∗ ∈ U exists satisfying
DF (x∗) = 0 to guarantee x∗ is the unique global max of F on U .
The first-order conditions are:
(1− α)θp
( k
zi + zj
)α
= κzi (7)
(1− α)θp
( k
zi + zj
)α
= κzj (8)
αθp
( k
zi + zj
)α−1
= r (9)
(7) and (8) imply z∗ = zi = zj for any given k. The first-order conditions reduce
(1− α)θp
( k
2z∗
)α
= κz∗ (10)
αθp
( k
2z∗
)α−1
= r (11)
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By putting (11) into (10), I get
z∗ =
(1− α
κ
)
θ
1
1−α
p
(α
r
) α
1−α
and hence k∗ = 2
(1− α
κ
)(α
r
) 1+α
1−α
θ
2
1−α
p = 2aˆθ
2
1−α
p
Therefore, I derived the unique x∗ = (z∗, z∗, k∗) such that DF (x∗) = 0.
Given that the aggregate production is distributed equally, the value function per parter
is given by
V Ep (θp, Ap) =
1
2
[
θpk
∗α(2z∗)1−α − rk∗
]
− κ
2
z∗2 = a1θ
2
1−α
p
(Case 2) λAp < 2aˆθ
2
1−α
p
In this case, k ≤ λAp is binding and k∗ = λAp. The problem reduces
max
{zi,zj}
F (zi, zj) =
[
θpk
α(zi + zj)
1−α︸ ︷︷ ︸
Aggregate production
−
(
rk +
κ
2
(
z2i + z
2
j
))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Aggregate cost
]
subject to (zi, zj) > 0, α ∈ (0, 1), κ > 0, Ap ≥ 0, k = λAp
Following the same argument as in (Case 1), there exists the unique maximum and
zi = zj = z
∗ =
(1− α
κ
) 1
1+α
(λAp
2
) α
1+α
θ
1
1+α
p
Therefore,
V Ep (θp, Ap) =
1
2
[
θpk
∗α(2z∗)1−α − rk∗
]
− κ
2
z∗2 = a2
(λAp
2
) 2α
1+α
θ
2
1+α
p − rλAp
2
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D Non-transferable Utility vs. Transferable Utility
Although the observed equity share is mostly 50% to 50%, potential partners may use an ex-
ante transfer to attract a better partner during the matching stage. In this section, I allow an
ex-ante transfer in the matching stage and compare the matching outcome with the benchmark
outcome in which an ex-ante transfer is not allowed.
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Once we allow an ex-ante transfer, the matching problem becomes the so-called room-
mate problem with transferable utility. Before explaining the computational algorithm under
transferable utility, I first discuss how I handle a fundamental problem arising when assuming
transferable utility for the roommate problem: a stable matching may not exist. To guarantee
the existence of a stable matching, I “clone” the entire population. Then I define the origi-
nal population as Side 1 and the cloned population as Side 2, and find a stable matching by
assuming an agent from Side 1 can form a partnership only with an agent from Side 2, and
vice versa. Agent x on Side 1 cannot form a partnership with Agent y on Side 1, but the
Agent x can always find an identical Agent y in Side 2. Although restrictive, this procedure
always guarantees a stable matching. Moreover, the sorting pattern from this procedure with-
out financial friction is identical to the one with non-transferable utility, so that I can clearly
compare the impact of financial friction on the sorting pattern under different transferability
assumptions.
The problem in the production stage is the same as before. In the matching stage, agents
decide with whom they want to match and how much they want to split the outcome produced
in the production stage. We can think this procedure as allowing an ex-ante transfer in the
matching stage. Suppose Agent i and j are matched in the stable matching, and the division
of the outcome for Agent i and j are 40% and 60%, respectively. This situation corresponds to
the one in which the equity share in the production stage is 50% to 50%, and Agent i transfers
10% of the outcome in cash to Agent j in the matching stage.
To find the stable matching with transferable utility, I use the algorithm developed by
Crawford and Knoer (1981).37 They provide a transfer-adjustment process and show the
process generates a stable matching and it terminates with a finite times. The process starts
with agents on one side, say, Side 1, making an offer to an agent on Side 2 as follows:
STEP1
- For Agent i in Side 1, calculate the initial transfers tij(0) = oj, where oj
is the outside option value for Agent j on Side 2.
STEP2
37Andersson et al. (2014) provide an algorithm to find a stable matching, or exclusively disproves the existence
of any equilibrium under a one-sided setup. Without guaranteeing the existence of a stable matching, however,
the procedure may not generate a matching outcome. Moreover, implementing the algorithm is computationally
very costly. For these reasons, I use the current cloning methodology.
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- Calculate maxj
{
Vij−tij(0)
}
. If the maximized value is less than the outside
option of Agent i, do not make an offer. If the maximized value is greater
than the outside option, make an offer tij∗(0) to Agent j
∗ on Side 2.
STEP3
- An agents on Side 2 who receives one or more offers rejects all but his or
her favorite, which he or she tentatively accepts.
STEP4
- Offers not rejected in previous periods remain in force. If Agent j on Side
2 rejects an offer from Agent i on Side 1 in period t−1, update the transfer
as tij(t) = tij(t − 1) + d, where d is a constant. If not, tij(t) = tij(t − 1).
Rejected Agents on Side 1 continue to make offers to their favorite Agents
on Side 2, taking into account their current permitted transfers.
STEP5
- The process stops when no rejection occurs.
I parameterize an economy to be same as the one in section 3.4, and simulate 50 individuals:
{κ, α} = {1, 0.3}, log θw = 0, log θs ∼ N(1, 1), log g ∼ N(0, 1), logA ∼ N(0, 10)
Then I clone 50 simulated individuals so that the total number of agents in a matching market
is 100. With the same individuals, I compute stable matching, one under non-transferable
utility (NTU) and the other under transferable utility (TU).
The results are reported in the first column of Table 20 and Figure 11. I first report the
results without financial friction. The selection pattern, the number of individuals for each
choice, and the sorting pattern among patterns are identical both for NTU and TU. For NTU,
a positive assortative matching with respect to ability as a partner arises as in section 3.4, so
the best partner is matched with his cloned agent in the market, the second-best partner is
matched with his cloned agent in the market, and so on. As a result, the correlation between
partners’ ability and the correlation between partners’ log wealth are both 1. This selection
and sorting pattern is the one generating the highest aggregate utility, and hence they are also
equilibrium selection and sorting pattern for TU. Indeed, the computational algorithms for
TU and NTU are very different, but they generate identical equilibrium outcomes.
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Now I introduce financial constraints by setting λ = 1. The results are reported in the
second column of Table 20 and Figure 12. First, the selection pattern, the number of individuals
for each choice, is identical both for NTU and TU. Second, as shown in section 3.4, the positive
assortative sorting with respect to ability is less pronounced once the financial constraints are
introduced. For example, with TU, the ability correlation between two partners is 0.46 with
λ being equal to 1, as opposed to 1 without financial friction. On the other hand, the sorting
pattern with respect to log wealth exhibits a negative assortative sorting once the financial
constraints are introduced. For example, with TU, the log wealth correlation between two
partners is -0.67, with λ being equal to 1, as opposed to 1 without financial friction. Third,
the sorting pattern, both for ability and log wealth, are very similar across NTU and TU.
For example, the ability correlation between two partners is 0.46 and 0.40 for NTU and TU,
respectively, and the log wealth correlation between two partners is -0.67 and -0.67 for NTU
and TU, respectively.
Figure 13 shows the histogram for the division of the outcome for partners on Side 1 under
TU. When no financial friction is present, the share is concentrated near 0.5, but the agents
on Side 1, who offer the transfer in the transfer-adjustment process, always have more shares
than their partners. When λ is equal to 1, the share among agents on Side 1 is much more
dispersed compared to the one without financial friction, and the share for agents on Side 1 is
often less than 0.5.
As a robustness check, I simulate two other economies. First, with other parameters being
equal as before, I change the distribution of g as log g ∼ N(−0.3, 1) so that the number of
partners decreases at the stable matching. Second, with other parameters being equal as before,
I change the distribution of g as log g ∼ N(0.3, 1) so that the number of partners increases at
the stable matching. The results are reported from Table 21 to Table 22, and from Figure 14
to Figure 17. First of all, the selection and the sorting pattern without financial friction are
identical across NTU and TU for all cases. Even in the case of λ being equal to 1, the selection
and the sorting pattern are very similar across NTU and TU for all cases.
Computational Difficulty with Non-transferable Utility Although the equilib-
rium outcome is very similar between NTU and TU, the computational time increases much
faster for TU than for NTU as the number of agents increases. Moreover, the equilibrium
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outcome often depends on the discrete offer d in STEP 4 for TU. For example, as d becomes
larger, the positive assortativeness with respect to ability becomes less pronounced.
E Random Matching
As a robustness check, I introduce a search friction into the model. I estimated the parameters
under the assumption that the matching market is frictionless. The frictionless assumption
has an implication for the estimates of the collaborative skill. Without a search friction, the
collaborative skill may be estimated as low to match the small proportion of business partners
in the data.
A search friction can be implemented as follows. The frictionless matching market allows
an agent to be matched with any other agent in the market. We can limit this possibility by
dividing the market into, for example, two groups and not allowing an agent in one group to
be matched with any agent in the other group. As an extreme, two agents in the market are
randomly matched to each other and not allowed to form a partnership with any other agent
except for the randomly matched agent. I re-estimate the model under this random-matching
assumption. For estimation, I assign each individual in the final sample a matched agent who
is drawn from the uniform distribution over the final sample with replacement.
The parameter estimates under the random matching are similar to those under the fric-
tionless matching. Notably, g0, the constant term for log collaborative skill, is still estimated
to be negative; it was estimated as −1.3726 under the frictionless matching, and is estimated
as −1.3283 under the random matching. I also simulate the collaborative skill with the new
estimates and compare it with Figure 7. The result is shown in Figure 18. The distribution of
g is shifted toward the right. Hence, the proportion of agents whose productivity as a partner
is greater than their solo productivity increases from 3.5% to 4.5%. Even so, most individuals
are still estimated to have less productivity as a partner than alone.
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F Further Characterization of Matching Outcome
Allowing correlation between θs and wealth
To see how the correlation between one’s ability as a single owner θs and wealth affects the
matching outcome under financial friction, I simulate the identical economy as in section 3.4:
{κ, α, λ} = {1, 0.3, 1}, log θw = 0, log θs ∼ N(1, 1), log g ∼ N(0, 1), logA ∼ N(0, 10)
The outcome from the benchmark economy where the correlation is zero is reported in the
first column in Table 23. I also simulate three identical economies except for the correlation
between log θs and logA. The matching outcome with correlations of 0.1, 0.3, and 0.5 are
reported in the second, third, and fourth columns in Table 23, respectively.
First, both the average log earnings for single owners and the average log earnings for
partners increase as the correlation increases. Those who have a high θs will become business
owners. If the correlation between θs and wealth is positive, those with a high θs are more
likely to have high wealth, and hence are less likely to be financially constrained compared to
the case where the correlation is zero.
Second, when the correlation between θs and wealth is positive, those with a high θs are
more likely to have high wealth, and thus have less incentive to find a partner for financing. As
a result, the number of single owners increase slightly, and the number of partners decreases
slightly. On the other hand, the number of workers varies little as the correlation changes.
Third, regarding the sorting pattern among partners, positive sorting with respect to ability
increases and negative sorting with respect to wealth decreases as the correlation between θs
and wealth increases. Those who have high ability as a partner are more likely to have high
wealth if the correlation is positive, and hence are less likely to sacrifice the productivity gain
in exchange for the financing gain.
Overall, the correlation between θs and wealth may change business owners’ average log
earnings and their sorting pattern, but the selection pattern and average log earnings for
workers change only slightly.
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Allowing correlation between g and worker ability
In this section, I introduce an unobserved worker ability, and let it correlate with the collab-
orative skill g. More specifically, I simulate the same economy as in section 3.4 except for
making the worker ability θw follow a log normal distribution with E[θw] = 1, and allowing it
to be correlated with g:
{κ, α, λ} = {1, 0.3, 1}, log θw ∼ N(−0.5, 1), log θs ∼ N(1, 1), log g ∼ N(0, 1), logA ∼ N(0, 10)
The outcome from the benchmark economy where the correlation is zero is reported in the
first column in Table 24. I also simulate three identical economies except for the correlation
between log θw and log g. The matching outcome with correlations of 0.1, 0.3, and 0.5 are
reported in the second, third, and fourth columns in Table 24, respectively.
First, the average log earnings for workers decrease and the average log earnings for partners
increase as the correlation between worker ability and collaborative skill increases. Those who
become partners have higher collaborative skill, and are more likely to have higher worker
productivity if the correlation is positive. Thus, those who do not become partners have
lower worker productivity on average, and hence the average log earnings for workers will be
lower. At the same time, some individuals who could have become partners without a positive
correlation receive a high outside option value and become workers. The positive assortative
matching occurs without those individuals, and some individuals who were at the margin to
be a partner cannot find a partner and are forced to become either a worker or a single owner.
As a result, the number of partners slightly decreases and the average log earnings for partners
increase.
Second, because those who do not become partners have lower worker productivity on
average, individuals who have low ability as a single owner are more likely to become single
owners. As a result, the number of single owners increases, and the average log earnings for
single owners decrease.
Overall, although the correlation between worker ability and the collaborative skill may
change the average log earnings for each occupation, the selection pattern and the sorting
pattern change only slightly.
Implication to main results Because a positive correlation between worker ability
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and collaborative skill may change the average log earnings for each occupation, the estimates
for the earning equations may be biased if we assume the correlation to be zero while the true
correlation is positive. For example, the estimates for the wage equation could be biased below
under a positive correlation between worker ability and collaborative skill.
Nevertheless, the main results would not change much, because the selection and the sorting
pattern change only marginally with the correlation. Note the results in section 5.2, 6, and 7
quantify the relative importance between the productivity and the financing gains. Because
those results mainly depend on the selection and the sorting pattern, the results would not
change much even under a positive correlation between worker ability and collaborative skill
given that the selection and the sorting pattern change only marginally with the correlation.
G Additional Tables and Figures
Table 16: Moments for Ownership Choice
Observed Simulated
Ki Zi
1
n
∑n
i=1KiZi
1
n
∑n
i=1 K˜i(ψ)Zi
Isi 1 0.0206 0.0204
Ai 0.5697 0.5632
x1i 0.2862 0.2953
x2i 0.4570 0.3476
Aix1i 8.5304 8.5514
Aix2i 14.3210 10.9464
Ipi 1 0.0044 0.0046
Ai 0.1693 0.1050
x1i 0.0628 0.0680
x2i 0.0911 0.0955
Aix1i 2.4609 1.6459
Aix2i 4.1321 2.5353
NOTE: This table compares the actual and the simulated moments for ownership choice. Isi is the indicator
function for single owners. Ipi is the indicator functions for partners. A is net worth (10,000 USD in 2011). x1
is the years of education. x2 is the years of experience.
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Table 17: Moments for log Conditional Incomes
Observed Simulated
Ki Zi
1
n
∑n
i=1 KiZi
1
n
∑n
i=1 K˜i(ψ)Zi
piwi Iwi 1 1.3409 1.3557
x1i 19.3565 19.0884
x2i 30.7715 30.6790(
piwi − 1∑ Iwi ∑ piwiIwi)2Iwi 1 0.6141 0.6117
pisi Issi 1 0.0096 0.0112
Ai 0.4691 0.3750
x1i 0.1480 0.1680
x2i 0.2349 0.2146
Aix1i 7.4289 5.9648
Aix2i 12.1086 7.8525(
pisi − 1∑ Issi
∑
pisiIssi
)2Issi 1 0.0409 0.0539
Ifsi 1 0.0024 0.0025
pipi Ispi 1 0.0049 0.0051
Ai 0.2097 0.1239
x1i 0.0729 0.0769
x2i 0.0985 0.1123
Aix1i 3.0885 1.9712
Aix2i 5.0356 3.2836(
pipi − 1∑ Ispi
∑
pipiIspi
)2Ispi 1 0.0056 0.0075
Ifpi 1 0.0003 0.0003
NOTE: This table compares the actual and the simulated moments for log conditional incomes. piwi is log
income conditional on i being a worker. pisi is log income conditional on i being a single owner, and i reports a
positive income. Issi is the indicator function for single owners who report a positive income. I
f
si is the indicator
function for single owners who report a negative or zero income. pipi is log income conditional on i being a
partner, and i reports a positive income. Ispi is the indicator function for partners who report a positive income.
Ifpi is the indicator function for partners who report a negative or zero income. A is net worth (10,000 USD in
2011). x1 is the years of education. x2 is the years of experience.
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Table 18: Number of Observations at Each Stage of Sample Construction
Drop if Workers Single Owners Partners
250,609 13,686 3,174
Business owners in the base year 247,860 3,301 508
Female 114,985 1,772 300
Age < 18 or > 65 66,200 1,584 284
Unemployed in either one of periods 49,911 1,270 250
No info. on net worth 49,186 1,251 247
Net worth > $10 billion 49,171 1,251 247
Family business 48,869 1,200 181
Equity share < 25% 48,869 946 181
NOTE: Business owners whose equity share is less than 25% were categorized as single owners before being
deleted.
Table 19: Proportion of African-Americans with Respect to Income before Tax
$18,559 $35,645 $58,272 $93,837
∼ ∼ ∼ ∼ ∼
$18,559 $35,645 $58,272 $93,837
CEX 2011 (%) 20 14 11 11 6
Final sample (%) 12 12 9 7 4
NOTE: Dollar in 2011. This table compares the proportion of African-Americans in terms of income levels
both for the final sample and for CEX 2011. For the final sample, incomes in the base year is used.
Table 20: Sorting Pattern (log g ∼ N(0, 1)): NTU vs. TU
Economy with λ =∞ Economy with λ = 1
NTU TU NTU TU
# of workers 20 20 22 22
# of single owners 36 36 26 26
# of partners 44 44 52 52
Corr(P1.ability, P1.ability) 1 1 0.46 0.40
Corr(logA1, logA2) 1 1 -0.67 -0.67
NOTE: This table reports the selection and the sorting pattern from two simulated economies. I simulate 100
individuals, as explained in Appendix D, from the economy characterized as follows: {κ, α} = {1, 0.3}, θw = 1,
log θs ∼ N(1, 1), log g ∼ N(0, 1), logA ∼ N(0, 10). The first two columns of the table report the results
without financial friction, and the last two columns of the table report the results with λ = 1. NTU refers to
the matching market not allowing ex-ante transfer. TU refers to the matching allowing ex-ante transfer.
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Table 21: Sorting Pattern (log g ∼ N(−0.3, 1)): NTU vs. TU
Economy with λ =∞ Economy with λ = 1
NTU TU NTU TU
# of workers 28 28 30 30
# of single owners 50 50 38 36
# of partners 22 22 32 34
Corr(P1.ability, P1.ability) 1 1 0.36 0.48
Corr(logA1, logA2) 1 1 -0.89 -0.75
NOTE: This table reports the selection and the sorting pattern from two simulated economies. I simulate 100
individuals, as explained in Appendix D, from the economy characterized as follows: {κ, α} = {1, 0.3}, θw = 1,
log θs ∼ N(1, 1), log g ∼ N(−0.3, 1), logA ∼ N(0, 10). The first two columns of the table report the results
without financial friction, and the last two columns of the table report the results with λ = 1. NTU refers to
the matching market not allowing ex-ante transfer. TU refers to the matching allowing ex-ante transfer.
Table 22: Sorting Pattern (log g ∼ N(0.3, 1)): NTU vs. TU
Economy with λ =∞ Economy with λ = 1
NTU TU NTU TU
# of workers 18 18 18 20
# of single owners 26 26 16 16
# of partners 56 56 66 64
Corr(P1.ability, P1.ability) 1 1 0.35 0.40
Corr(logA1, logA2) 1 1 -0.67 -0.71
NOTE: This table reports the selection and the sorting pattern from two simulated economies. I simulate 100
individuals, as explained in Appendix D, from the economy characterized as follows: {κ, α} = {1, 0.3}, θw = 1,
log θs ∼ N(1, 1), log g ∼ N(0.3, 1), logA ∼ N(0, 10). The first two columns of the table report the results
without financial friction, and the last two columns of the table report the results with λ = 1. NTU refers to
the matching market not allowing ex-ante transfer. TU refers to the matching allowing ex-ante transfer.
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Table 23: Matching Outcome under Correlation between θ and Wealth
correlation between θ and wealth
Benchmark corr = 0.1 corr = 0.3 corr = 0.5
# of workers 2,983 2,992 2,977 2,983
# of single owners 2,533 2,544 2,589 2,617
# of partners 4,484 4,464 4,434 4,400
Corr(P1.ability, P1.ability) 0.68 0.69 0.72 0.74
Corr(logA1, logA2) -0.67 -0.65 -0.63 -0.60
Ave. log earnings for workers -0.68 -0.68 -0.68 -0.68
Ave. log earnings for single owners 1.48 1.49 1.53 1.57
Ave. log earnings for partners 2.51 2.54 2.57 2.60
NOTE: This table reports the selection and the sorting pattern as well as the average log earnings for each
occupation from four simulated economies. I simulate 10,000 individuals from the economy characterized as
follows: {κ, α, λ} = {1, 0.3, 1}, log θw = 0, log θs ∼ N(1, 1), log g ∼ N(0, 1), logA ∼ N(0, 10). Benchmark
refers to the economy without correlation between log θs and logA. “corr” refers to the correlation between
log θs and logA.
Table 24: Matching Outcome under Correlation between g and Worker Ability
correlation between g and worker ability
corr = 0 corr = 0.1 corr = 0.3 corr = 0.5
# of workers 2,585 2,559 2,492 2,413
# of single owners 2,863 2,909 3,010 3,121
# of partners 4,552 4,532 4,498 4,466
Corr(P1.ability, P1.ability) 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.86
Corr(logA1, logA2) -0.62 -0.63 -0.62 -0.60
Ave. log earnings for workers -0.77 -0.80 -0.87 -0.96
Ave. log earnings for single owners 1.15 1.12 1.05 0.98
Ave. log earnings for partners 2.45 2.46 2.48 2.51
NOTE: This table reports the selection and the sorting pattern as well as the average log earnings for each
occupation from four simulated economies. I simulate 10,000 individuals from the economy characterized as
follows: {κ, α, λ} = {1, 0.3, 1}, log θw ∼ N(−0.5, 1), log θs ∼ N(1, 1), log g ∼ N(0, 1), logA ∼ N(0, 10).
Benchmark refers to the economy without correlation between log θw and log g. “corr” refers to the correlation
between log θw and log g.
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Figure 11: Sorting Pattern without Financial Friction: NTU (Left Column) vs. TU (Right
Column)
NOTE: The left column is the sorting pattern under non-transferable utility (NTU). The right column is the
sorting pattern under transferable utility (TU). The top two figures show the sorting patterns with respect to
ability. The bottom two figures show the sorting patterns with respect to log wealth. P1.ability and P2.ability
refer to Partner 1’s ability and Partner 2’s ability, respectively. ln(A1) and ln(A2) refer to Partner 1’s log wealth
and Partner 2’s log wealth, respectively. Different colors represent a different number of observations. I simulate
100 individuals, as explained in Appendix D, from the economy characterized as follows: {κ, α} = {1, 0.3},
log θw = 0, log θs ∼ N(1, 1), log g ∼ (0, 1), logA ∼ (0, 10).
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Figure 12: Sorting Pattern with λ = 1 (log g ∼ N(0, 1)): NTU (Left Column) vs. TU (Right
Column)
NOTE: The left column is the sorting pattern under non-transferable utility (NTU). The right column is the
sorting pattern under transferable utility (TU). The top two figures show the sorting patterns with respect to
ability. The bottom two figures show the sorting patterns with respect to log wealth. P1.ability and P2.ability
refer to Partner 1’s ability and Partner 2’s ability, respectively. ln(A1) and ln(A2) refer to Partner 1’s log wealth
and Partner 2’s log wealth, respectively. Different colors represent a different number of observations. I simulate
100 individuals, as explained in Appendix D, from the economy characterized as follows: {κ, α, λ} = {1, 0.3, 1},
log θw = 0, log θs ∼ N(1, 1), log g ∼ (0, 1), logA ∼ (0, 10).
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Figure 13: The Division of the Outcome for Agents on Side 1 (log g ∼ N(0, 1)): No Financial
Friction (Left) vs. λ = 1 (right)
NOTE: The left figure shows the histogram for the division of the outcome for agents on Side 1 when no
financial friction is present. The right figure shows the histogram for the division of the outcome for agents
on Side 1 when λ = 1. The number is normalized by the total value from the partnership. I simulate
100 individuals, as explained in Appendix D, from the economy characterized as follows: {κ, α} = {1, 0.3},
log θw = 0, log θs ∼ N(1, 1), log g ∼ (0, 1), logA ∼ (0, 10)
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Figure 14: Sorting Pattern with λ = 1 (log g ∼ N(−0.3, 1)): NTU (Left Column) vs. TU (Right
Column)
NOTE: The left column is the sorting pattern under non-transferable utility (NTU). The right column is the
sorting pattern under transferable utility (TU). The top two figures show the sorting patterns with respect to
ability. The bottom two figures show the sorting patterns with respect to log wealth. P1.ability and P2.ability
refer to Partner 1’s ability and Partner 2’s ability, respectively. ln(A1) and ln(A2) refer to Partner 1’s log wealth
and Partner 2’s log wealth, respectively. Different colors represent a different number of observations. I simulate
100 individuals, as explained in Appendix D, from the economy characterized as follows: {κ, α, λ} = {1, 0.3, 1},
log θw = 0, log θs ∼ N(1, 1), log g ∼ (−0.3, 1), logA ∼ (0, 10).
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Figure 15: The Division of the Outcome for Agents on Side 1 (log g ∼ N(−0.3, 1)): No Financial
Friction (Left) vs. λ = 1 (right)
NOTE: The left figure shows the histogram for the division of the outcome for agents on Side 1 when no
financial friction is present. The right figure shows the histogram for the division of the outcome for agents
on Side 1 when λ = 1. The number is normalized by the total value from the partnership. I simulate
100 individuals, as explained in Appendix D, from the economy characterized as follows: {κ, α} = {1, 0.3},
log θw = 0, log θs ∼ N(1, 1), log g ∼ (−0.3, 1), logA ∼ (0, 10).
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Figure 16: Sorting Pattern with λ = 1 (log g ∼ N(0.3, 1)): NTU (Left Column) vs. TU (Right
Column)
NOTE: The left column is the sorting pattern under non-transferable utility (NTU). The right column is the
sorting pattern under transferable utility (TU). The top two figures show the sorting patterns with respect to
ability. The bottom two figures show the sorting patterns with respect to log wealth. P1.ability and P2.ability
refer to Partner 1’s ability and Partner 2’s ability, respectively. ln(A1) and ln(A2) refer to Partner 1’s log wealth
and Partner 2’s log wealth, respectively. Different colors represent a different number of observations. I simulate
100 individuals, as explained in Appendix D, from the economy characterized as follows: {κ, α, λ} = {1, 0.3, 1},
log θw = 0, log θs ∼ N(1, 1), log g ∼ (0.3, 1), logA ∼ (0, 10).
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Figure 17: The Division of the Outcome for Agents on Side 1 (log g ∼ N(0.3, 1)): No Financial
Friction (Left) vs. λ = 1 (right)
NOTE: The left figure shows the histogram for the division of the outcome for agents on Side 1 when no
financial friction is present. The right figure shows the histogram for the division of the outcome for agents
on Side 1 when λ = 1. The number is normalized by the total value from the partnership. I simulate
100 individuals, as explained in Appendix D, from the economy characterized as follows: {κ, α} = {1, 0.3},
log θw = 0, log θs ∼ N(1, 1), log g ∼ (0.3, 1), logA ∼ (0, 10).
Figure 18: Kernel Density of Collaborative Skill: Frictionless Matching vs. Random Matching
NOTE: This figure shows Kernel density of a simulated value for g given covariates and estimates under different
matching markets. g greater than 1 means productivity as a partner is greater than the solo productivity. g
less than 1 means productivity as a partner is less than the solo productivity.
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